139During the sixteen months between Wallenstein’s dismissal and
reappointment the wider political situation became increasingly com-
plicated. Although Gustavus Adolphus was hailed as a prospective sav-
iour by many of the ordinary Protestant people of Germany his arrival
was far from welcome to most of their princes. They could see well
enough that a new outside intervention could only renew and prolong
the war in the Empire, and that they and their lands were likely to
suffer heavily in consequence. Sincere though Gustavus assuredly was
in his desire to assist the Protestant religion, his record of seizing and
holding territories along the Baltic coast of Poland left them in little
doubt that he had similar ambitions in Germany. Moreover with the
examples of Mecklenburg and the Palatinate fresh in mind the princes
feared Imperial retribution should they assist Gustavus, only for him,
like Christian of Denmark, nevertheless to be defeated. Neutrality was
their preference, but realistically this was only tenable from a position
of strength. Hence the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony convened
a meeting to discuss the situation, at which almost every significant
Protestant ruler in Germany was present or represented, as well as
delegates from a number of Imperial free cities. The resulting Leipzig
Manifesto of April 1631 provided for the creation of a force of 40,000
men, which was to be used strictly for self-defence if attacked, thereby
preserving its legality under the Imperial constitution. Nevertheless
there was an implicit threat to resist any further pressure from the
emperor, while the agreement also served notice on the Swedish
king that he could not expect willing support from the Protestant
princes. John George of Saxony rather reluctantly became head of the
association, and initially he was the only one to recruit a significant
number of troops, whereas the unfortunate elector of Brandenburg
10. Once More unto the Breach
( Henry V )