Wallenstein. The Enigma of the Thirty Years War

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140 Wallenstein


soon discovered that Gustavus had no time for neutrals. In June he was
coerced by a show of force into a nominal alliance with the Swedes,
after which they commandeered the important fortresses and other
resources of his electorate.
Meanwhile Gustavus found support elsewhere, paradoxically from
Catholic France. At Regensburg, in parallel to the contest over
Wallenstein, negotiations had taken place between France and the
emperor over a number of issues, including the war in Italy. When
news arrived that Mantua had actually fallen the French representatives
panicked, and in the absence of fresh instructions from Paris they con-
cluded a peace on their own authority, but the king of France angrily
refused to ratify the treaty and the war went on into the following year.
This left the French looking for other ways of putting pressure on the
emperor, so leading them back to the Swedes. The result was the treaty
of Bärwalde in January 1631, by which France agreed to provide finan-
cial support for the Swedish war effort over a period of five years. The
amount of money was relatively modest, but it came at a point when
Gustavus’s finances were most severely stretched, and he also strength-
ened his position by publicly announcing the alliance, even though
Richelieu would have preferred to keep it secret. In return he agreed
to maintain freedom of Catholic worship as he advanced, willingly
enough as he was in any case tolerant about this, and also to respect
the neutrality of Catholic League lands provided that they themselves
remained neutral.
Maximilian of Bavaria was also engaged in feverish diplomatic
manoeuvring. He had done very well out of the war, but as the Swedes
gained strength he became more and more anxious about being able to
hold on to his spoils, particularly as restoring Frederick to his Palatinate
was one of the aims which Gustavus was trumpeting abroad. Maximilian
had no friends among the Protestant princes, and he was all but openly
hostile to Spain, so he had to look elsewhere for allies, leading him to
renew his long-standing but intermittent contact with France. This
time dalliance progressed to something more substantial, the secret
treaty of Fontainebleau, which was concluded in May 1631. In this the
French not only recognised Maximilian’s new lands and electoral title
but also promised to assist him should he be attacked, while he in
turn agreed to give no help to the enemies of France. The two treaties,
Bärwalde and Fontainebleau, were inherently incompatible, but they
served the French purpose of creating further problems for Ferdinand.
Maximilian’s position was similarly contradictory, duty bound to the
Empire on the one hand, but on the other in alliance with the emperor’s

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