146 Wallenstein
Could not someone else have done much the same thing? In 1625
there had been one factor which was unique to Wallenstein; he was the
only one who had the necessary financial resources and was prepared
to commit them to the undertaking. In 1632 this was not the case, as
Wallenstein was no longer in a position to make a major personal con-
tribution, and nor was de Witte on hand to facilitate raising loans. That
apart, in some ways the job may have been a little easier in 1632, as
there was a larger nucleus available upon which to build, while having
done it all once before Wallenstein was in a position to gain from his
own experience. His knowledge of the key officers and specialists was
much greater, as many, if not most, will have served under him in the
intervening years, and his grasp of the sourcing of supplies, weapons
and munitions had developed commensurately. In other respects the
task may have been harder than in 1625. Morale was an obvious prob-
lem in the remains of an army which had been abruptly dismembered,
added to which some units had only recently straggled back from the
ultimately pointless campaign in Italy, while others had been with
Tilly at Breitenfeld. The knowledge that the next opponent was to be
Gustavus Adolphus, who was rapidly becoming a living legend, cannot
have helped. Above all there was the pressure of time, the awareness that
Gustavus would be in the field early in the year with a large, successful
and now battle-tried army, while on the Imperialist side there was so
much to do before he could be faced at all, let alone with confidence.
Other generals had also demonstrated proficiency in raising new
armies quickly. Mansfeld had been something of a specialist, although
with forces one tenth of the size. On the other hand the track record
of such generals was not encouraging, as their hastily gathered hosts
were not infrequently effectively destroyed at their first serious test. The
notable exception was Gustavus himself, the only other early modern
commander up to that time to have raised an army of 100,000 men.
Even he, however, had taken much longer to build up to this number
from the core of 17,000 well-organised troops he started with in north
Germany. Wallenstein’s achievements in this respect are therefore
unique.
So, it can be argued, were the circumstances, so could someone
else have done it? No-one seems to have thought so at the time, and
although there were would-be generals on the Imperial war council
none of them commended themselves to the emperor and his closest
advisers. Gallas later went from bad to worse as a commander in less
challenging circumstances, although he inherited the army rather than
having to create it. Arnim achieved a lot in a short time for the elector