160 Wallenstein
counter-attack. Wallenstein assumed that his intention was to move
on around the Imperialist camp in order to attack from the west, and
he made his own preparations accordingly. This time he was ready to
give battle, both because his weaker defences on this side made it advis-
able and also because the ground here was to his advantage. According
to the contemporary Nuremberg plan he arranged his forces on a
north-south line in front of the southern section of his camp, with the
left (south) flank secured by the high ground of the Petershöhe and
its artillery fortress, and the right by the Bibert river. A smaller artil-
lery fort outside the perimeter was included in this line, while a third
battery inside the camp was so placed as to be able to fire between or
over the Imperialist formations. Cavalry were stationed to the left on
the Petershöhe, as well as within the perimeter ready to emerge where
needed, while the main infantry reserve was also kept behind the
defences. This was a strong position, as the ground, although not steep,
slopes steadily upwards towards the camp, while both wings were well
secured and the perimeter fortifications provided shelter for an orderly
retreat should it be required. However the historians of the Swedish
General Staff show a different configuration, with the Imperialist army
arrayed on an east-west line above the south bank of the River Bibert,
and with its right flank on the camp defences.^10 It is possible that
both are correct. Wallenstein may well have stationed an advance guard
along the Bibert in order to hamper a Swedish crossing, or to threaten
their flank should they have attempted to attack the camp on the rising
ground north of the river. If so this advance guard could have been
intended to fall back as the battle progressed, joining or withdrawing
behind the main body positioned as previously described.
Much to Wallenstein’s surprise the Swedish army did not appear,
although he kept the Imperialist forces in the field ready for battle for
the whole of 2 September and through the following night.^11 Instead
Gustavus spent the day constructing a defensive position at Fürth, on
an east-west line parallel to Wallenstein’s northern perimeter and about
a mile and a half back from the ridge which led up to it. At the same
time he was making preparations and giving orders for the quite dif-
ferent plan he had for 3 September, an unconventional surprise attack
on the strongest part of Wallenstein’s defences around the Alte Veste.
This was a major error, as will be seen, but first we need to consider the
reasons for it.
It has often been claimed that Gustavus was misled by information
from prisoners or his own scouts into believing that Wallenstein’s
move out of his camp was not to prepare for battle but to make a hasty