From the Fury of the Norsemen Deliver Us 161retreat, so that he decided to attack from the north, expecting that the
fortifications would be defended at most by a small rearguard. This
tale probably stems from contemporary pro-Swedish sources which
preferred to blame faulty intelligence rather than the king’s judgement,
but it is not credible. Gustavus was noted for his careful reconnaissance,
and it is inconceivable that he or his scouts could have mistaken an
Imperialist army standing in the field all day in battle order for one hur-
riedly making its escape. One of those best placed to know, Oxenstierna,
wrote an account of the battle for the Swedish council, and he does
indeed mention reports of an Imperialist retreat and a prisoner who
confirmed them on 2 September, but he goes on to say that Gustavus
immediately set out with an escort to make a personal assessment, that
there were skirmishes, and that ‘the enemy was thus forced to battle,
and had to bring back his guns and look to his defences’. The king
himself, in a letter to the elector of Saxony, also refers to information
that Wallenstein was withdrawing, leaving only a few regiments as a
rearguard, but he immediately adds that the report of the retreat was
found to be false and that the enemy had only changed position some-
what. Hence when he launched his assault Gustavus was well aware
that Wallenstein and his army were still drawn up for battle outside
the western perimeter. If not there would have been no point in attack-
ing an almost empty camp on its strongest side. Nor was the plan an
impromptu response to an unforeseen development. Robert Monro,
a Scottish colonel in Gustavus’s army, states in his memoirs that the
king’s plan was to capture the high ground to the north in order to
drive Wallenstein out of his camp, and hence ‘we marched in the night
through Furt, towards the other side of the enemies Leaguer, of inten-
tion to take in the hill’. Furthermore the coordinated attacks at multi-
ple points early on 3 September had clearly been carefully planned,
while the only apparent reason for building the defensive line at Fürth
the previous day was to cover a retreat if they did not succeed.^12
The truth was probably simpler. As an experienced general Gustavus
knew that Wallenstein would expect him to attack the camp next on its
weakest side, but he also knew that if it came to a battle there between
armies of similar size Wallenstein would have the advantages of the
ground, of being in position first, and of having his defences to fall back
upon, whereas the Swedes would have no ready line of retreat. Faced
with this unattractive prospect Gustavus decided, as he had at Rain, to
do the unexpected and to attempt what others thought could not be
done. Had a commando-style attack from the north succeeded quickly,
he could have captured Wallenstein’s camp behind him, together with