170 Wallenstein
a strong contingent for the latter city, so that in the event of an attack
on one a large relief force could have been quickly assembled from the
others. However these units did not leave Lützen in the first instance.
Holk himself was to go further afield over the winter, to Westphalia
and beyond, in order to secure important towns, raise contributions
and recruit new men for the following year. The numbers of men he
required to garrison each place were listed, and regiments were allocated
for the purpose, but they likewise remained at Lützen at this stage.
Less certain is why Wallenstein waited at Lützen. The troops who
stayed were presumably those he intended to take to Halle in order to
attack Gustavus, and it may be that he delayed his departure, as Holk
said, because of his own illness. However he may also have deemed it
advisable to wait for the Swede to show his hand before moving, and
he despatched a senior officer, Major-General Rudolf Colloredo, back to
Weissenfels with 300 infantry and some light cavalry, so-called Croats,
probably to watch and keep in touch with the king’s movements. In the
meantime he evidently felt strong enough to stay at Lützen. It was his
first, indeed his only, major mistake in his duel with the king, as he had
not anticipated how quickly Gustavus would act. Nevertheless he took
precautions, including withdrawing to Lützen, at a safer distance from
the Swedes, before despatching forces elsewhere, and he left troops to
guard the Rippach crossing. It has also been argued that a surviving
battle plan for Lützen which Pappenheim had with him the following
day was prepared beforehand by Wallenstein as a contingency measure,
rather than being hastily sketched after warning of Gustavus’s approach
was received. On the morning of 15 November the whole army was
drawn up in battle order from seven until nine in the morning to cover
the departing units against any possible attack, and the light cavalry
were kept in the field for the rest of the day just in case.^28 Pappenheim
reached Halle the same afternoon, where he was able to occupy the city
immediately without meeting any resistance.
Gustavus was on the move even earlier on that mid-November
morning. On arriving at Naumburg he had sent orders to Lüneburg
to come to join him, prescribing a circuitous route to avoid Leipzig,
via Grimma, fifteen miles south-east of the city, and then Altenburg,
twenty-three to the south.^29 As the Imperialists withdrew Gustavus saw
his chance. Hoping by moving immediately to be well on his way before
an interception or pursuit could be organised, he set off eastwards
towards Grimma to try to meet Lüneburg. Wallenstein had guessed
wrong. Nevertheless the king could have had no idea of the Imperialist
dispersals, as they had not yet begun, and still believing himself to have