Wallenstein. The Enigma of the Thirty Years War

(Kiana) #1
From the Fury of the Norsemen Deliver Us 171

the weaker army he was not ‘intending to do battle with the enemy,
but to advance towards and join up with [Lüneburg’s] Saxon troops’.
Hence Gustavus moved very cautiously, slowly and in full battle order,
in case the withdrawal was an attempted trap. His route took him to
the south of Weissenfels, and although sources are not clear on the
details it seems that cavalry outriders protecting his left wing clashed
with Colloredo’s Croats moving up to the town.^30 Prisoners were taken,
from whom Gustavus learned of Pappenheim’s despatch, but conversely
Colloredo learned that the Swedish army was on the march. The king
took stock of the situation. With the element of surprise gone he could
no longer hope to slip by the Imperialist army towards Lüneburg. He
had to change his plans, but his options were limited to retreating back
to Naumburg or preparing for battle with Wallenstein. Gustavus was
temperamentally inclined to the bold and unexpected course of action,
but he also realised that with Pappenheim on the way to Halle he would
have the Imperialists outnumbered until he could be recalled. It was a
brief window of opportunity, so he decided to attack at once.
This was about mid-day. Colloredo hastily withdrew, harassed by
Gustavus’s cavalry, but at the Rippach, a mere four miles from Lützen,
his men and the troops Wallenstein had left on guard, around 1000 in
all, staged a spirited and effective delaying action. Despite bringing up
their artillery the Swedes were unable to force a crossing until it was
already dusk and too late for an attack that day. Meanwhile despatch
riders sped out from Lützen after the recently departed units, and hasty
preparations for a battle were put in hand. Pappenheim could not be
expected back until the following day, but some of the others arrived
in time to take up their positions by torchlight.^31 Wallenstein had the
night to complete his defences and array his forces.
The country around Lützen is almost flat, with few natural features
helpful in positioning an army for battle. Instead Wallenstein stationed
his troops along the northern side of the road which runs north-east
from Lützen towards Leipzig. This road had ditches on either side, and
during the night the troops were set to work deepening them and raising
the road, while whatever timber could be gathered was sharpened into
spikes to hinder a cavalry attack. Although the road from Naumburg
along which the Swedes were advancing would have brought them up
on to the Imperialist right wing, this was protected by the town itself,
while marshy ground along a stream, the Mühlgraben, ensured that
they could not easily move round to the west of Lützen and attack
Wallenstein’s flank and rear, but would instead have to pass the town
to the south and east, bringing them up to face his line of battle.

Free download pdf