From the Fury of the Norsemen Deliver Us 173This alignment also meant that the road from Halle was to the Imperi-
alist rear, so that when Pappenheim arrived his men would readily be
able to take up their allotted positions. On Wallenstein’s right some
windmills stood on slightly elevated ground just outside the town, and
here he stationed his main artillery battery, while smaller batteries of
lighter guns were also placed towards the centre and left of the line. The
battle array followed the conventional pattern, with cavalry on the wings
flanking the main infantry force in the centre, with the reserves behind,
but the heavy cavalry was mainly on the right, leaving a more numer-
ous but mostly lighter contingent to hold the left. This was the weakest
point, with no flanking defence apart from another stream, the
Flossgraben, which was not a major obstacle, and it was hoped that
Pappenheim would arrive in time to remedy this deficiency.^32 The
sources are vague on the command arrangements, but it appears that
Pappenheim was to take over on the left as soon as he reached the field,
freeing Holk, who was initially posted there, to move across and take
over on the right, which Wallenstein himself commanded at the outset,
together with the whole of the centre.^33
Wallenstein moved swiftly, and the end result was probably as good as
could have been achieved on this ground even given more time, but the
main problem remained; when the battle began he was outnumbered
and outgunned. In total numbers the deficiency did not appear too
great, as Guthrie estimates 19,000 on the Swedish side against 16,800
Imperialists. Wallenstein actually had rather more cavalry, although
some of these were lightly armed Croat skirmishers, so that there may
have been a rough equality. However Gustavus had 13,000 infantry
to his 10,000, a superiority of 3000 men or 30 per cent, and the Swedes
had half as many guns again as the Imperialists.^34 Hence Gustavus was
able to arrange his men in a double line facing Wallenstein’s, with the
main force supplemented by a reserve across its full length. A Swedish
general, Count Nils Brahe, commanded the infantry in the centre,
Bernhard of Weimar and Gustavus himself commanded the forward
cavalry units on the Swedish left and right respectively, and the artillery
was distributed between several batteries along the line.^35
The Swedes halted for the night a mile or two short of Lützen, and
their attempts to move up early in the morning were hindered by fog.
Hence they had to wait for the light to improve before they could take
up their battle positions, but by the time they had done so the fog
had thickened, further delaying their attack. Gustavus could only wait
anxiously, knowing that Pappenheim could arrive at any time. The fog
also made it difficult for both sides to assess the strength and positions