17712. Of Peace and Other Demons
(After Marquez)
In January 1633 a small group of Imperial councillors prepared a memo-
randum for the emperor on the progress of the war.^1 Circumspectly
phrased, and with all the obligatory references to the righteousness of
the cause and the emperor’s duty to the church, their assessment was
nonetheless gloomy. After years of fighting, bloodshed and devasta-
tion of the emperor’s lands, the position of the Catholic church was
less, rather than more secure. Indeed, it was worse than it had been at
any time since the Reformation. There were far more Protestants than
Catholics in the Empire, a regrettable fact which assisted the emperor’s
enemies, as the success of the Swedish campaigns had shown. Prior
to Gustavus’s intervention the Catholic side had won many battles
but had not been able to achieve an enduring victory, but the loss of
one battle, Breitenfeld, had cost them most of Germany. A number of
Protestant princes of the Empire had allied themselves with the Swedes,
while others, including Catholics, had taken refuge in neutrality. The
emperor’s only reliable external ally, Spain, could provide little practical
help due to the continuing war in the Netherlands, while on the other
side France was assisting Sweden and had its own designs on Imperial
territory, while England and Holland were also actively hostile, and
Denmark was at best uncertain.
It was not realistic to think, they went on, that the situation could
be fundamentally altered by one or two successful battles, or to imagine
that the Catholic side could be restored to its former position by force
of arms quickly or even in a few years. The resources in the hands of
the enemy were far greater than those of the emperor’s hereditary lands,
where to impose further hardships on the population could provoke
another revolt, and even the Habsburg succession to the Imperial crown
could be called into question if the Estates of the Empire were further