178 Wallenstein
alienated by a continuing war. The military efforts of the previous year
had not been able to force the centre of the conflict away from the
emperor’s lands and deep into enemy territory, but they had at least
restored a balance, for a time, in which neither side could feel certain
of victory. That was precisely the situation in which peace negotiations
had the best chance of success, and the kings of Denmark and Poland
had both offered themselves as mediators, as had Landgrave Georg of
Hesse-Darmstadt. These opportunities should be pursued now, before
campaigning started again in the spring, and a truce should be sought
for the duration of negotiations in order to spare the emperor’s lands
further burdens of war.
The authors of this appraisal were Count Maximilian Trauttmansdorff,
a senior and increasingly influential councillor, Baron Peter Stralen dorf,
the vice-chancellor, and Bishop Antonius of Vienna, while Eggenberg
and Questenberg, who were known to hold similar views, were also
among the ‘peace party’ in Vienna. Wallenstein, never a politician and
for years absent from Vienna, was not one of their number, but his
analysis was identical. Lützen had been, as Wellington said of Waterloo,
‘the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life’, and Wallenstein real-
ised more clearly than anyone else that had Gustavus lived and won, it
would have been disastrous for the Imperialist side.
As it was Wallenstein had achieved his own minimum objectives
for 1632. He had prevented Gustavus from invading and occupying
the Habsburg hereditary lands, he had stemmed the tide of Swedish
victories, depriving them of their reputation for invincibility, and he
had inflicted, if not a decisive defeat, at least two severe setbacks on the
enemy. It was not enough. His own losses had not been so heavy that
his army could not be rebuilt over the winter, but he could not afford to
risk it again in a major battle with an opponent of comparable strength.
Were the army to be destroyed neither he nor the emperor had money
enough to raise another, and nor were sufficient men readily to be found
within the limited area still under Imperialist control. The Swedes were
not so constrained. They and their supporters held much of Germany,
giving them scope to raise contributions and troops much more widely,
and they had external allies with deep pockets and further territories for
recruitment at their disposal. Even without Gustavus they had able gen-
erals, while Oxenstierna had taken over the political control and was
intent on continuing where his king had left off. An Imperialist victory,
Wallenstein saw, was not achievable in any real and sustainable sense,
and although it was necessary to rebuild and maintain a strong army
the principal effort had to be directed towards finding a basis for peace.