Wallenstein. The Enigma of the Thirty Years War

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Of Peace and Other Demons 185

resentful of his earlier dismissal from command. These are understand-
able in the context of the standards of the age, and they were already the
stuff of common gossip, but they are not supported by any evidence in
Wallenstein’s own actions or letters. To sustain them analytically one has
further to assume – as indeed many contemporaries did – a Machiavellian
degree of cunning and dissimulation. That Wallenstein could be per-
suaded to abandon most of a lifetime in Habsburg service, and induced to
undertake an unparalleled and dishonourable betrayal of trust and duty,
may have been within the bounds of the imagination of daydreaming
Bohemian exiles, or of Feuquières, carried away by the cleverness of his
own scheming, but Oxenstierna’s scepticism was more realistic.
Two of Wallenstein’s most pronounced personal characteristics also
speak against it. Firstly he was perennially cautious, and far more
inclined towards preserving what he had than to risking everything on
his next move. Defecting to the enemy and reaching for the Bohemian
crown would have been appallingly risky undertakings, quite out of
keeping with one who had already turned down the half-offer of the
crown of Denmark on the grounds that he would not have been able
to maintain it.^13 Secondly Wallenstein was essentially a practical man,
whereas seeking election as the king of Bohemia was a wildly impracti-
cal idea. The emperor and the Habsburg party would have had to be
defeated and driven out before any election could have taken place,
and even then the outcome would have been unpredictable. Moreover
if, as Oxenstierna suggested, Bohemian political and religious liberties
were to be re-established, then resumptions of forfeit property would
inevitably also have been involved, thereby depriving Wallenstein of
his remaining possessions. Hence even if he could have secured elec-
tion he would have been a penniless puppet king entirely dependent
on Swedish or French patronage. How long that would have lasted once
the political convenience of the moment had been served is a question
Wallenstein could not fail to have asked himself, but it is unlikely that
he got that far. As in 1631, and as with the contacts with Gustavus
Adolphus through Arnim back in 1627, it is possible that he saw no
harm in seeing what the other side had to say, but improbable that he
took it at all seriously.
The only reasonably authentic statement that we have from
Wallenstein on the subject of the Bohemian crown is Bubna’s report
that he described any attempt upon it as gross villainy. A more public
action hardly suggested that he was trying to conciliate the Bohemian
exiles in order to become their king. Also in May 1633, Wallenstein
set up a commission to investigate and punish those whose behaviour

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