188 Wallenstein
of their allies very carefully. Wallenstein was similarly careful to keep
Vienna informed of the discussions, which were within his estab-
lished authority dating as far back as his contacts with Arnim at the
court’s request in 1631. The Saxon general’s consultations took three
weeks, during which an uneasy truce was maintained in Silesia, and
Wallenstein took the opportunity to entertain both Franz Albrecht and
Thurn in his camp, the latter invitation causing particular annoyance in
Vienna. When Arnim returned on 27 June it was with evasive answers
and references to Danish mediation at the planned conference in
Breslau. Privately he had been told of Swedish concerns about the truce,
while the imprecise nature of Wallenstein’s proposition allowed many
detailed problems to be raised by those who did not wish to pursue it.
Hostilities resumed, but only briefly. Wallenstein despatched a force to
mount a surprise attack on the nearby town of Schweidnitz, but the
Saxon garrison was ready and held out until Arnim arrived to relieve it.
Both armies then went back to their well-defended camps, and an infor-
mal truce replaced the previous official one, a situation which lasted for
over a month. Wallenstein did not give up hope of an agreement, but
in order to apply more pressure he repeated his tactic of the previous
year, sending Holk’s troops back into Saxony at the beginning of August
to remind the elector – or more precisely his unfortunate subjects – of
the horrors of war which only a more constructive move towards peace
could end.
Meanwhile in the early summer of 1633 a new plan for Spanish
intervention had been developed in Madrid, involving sending a large
army over the Alps from Italy to the Tyrol and thence to south-western
Germany. Its ambitious objectives were to secure Burgundy against the
French, to expel the Swedes first from Alsace and then from Swabia and
Franconia, to free the road to the Netherlands, and to link Germany
with Italy through a chain of garrisons. Some of the men were to
come from Italy, with others to be recruited in the Tyrol or elsewhere
en route, 24,000 in all, and support from the Imperialist army was also
envisaged. Wallenstein was firmly opposed to the idea, seeing it as a
repeat of the Spanish confrontation with France over Mantua which
had caused so much trouble in the latter years of his first command.
In early June he informed all concerned that he was not in a position
to provide any troops. Nevertheless planning continued, and a month
later Wallenstein warned the emperor that such a campaign would not
only bring the full power of France into the war against the Imperialists
but also destroy the prospects of the current peace contacts. The coun-
cillors in Vienna were at first inclined to agree with him, but as concerns