Of Peace and Other Demons 195of modern printed text, Wallenstein’s proposals a bare half page, of which
all the points of substance have been quoted in full above.^30
Naive but at least consistent. Wallenstein’s objective throughout 1633
was the same as it had been since his first contacts with Arnim in 1631,
to induce Saxony not merely to break with the Swedes but to resume alle-
giance to the emperor. John George, Arnim and Wallenstein all shared a
deep dislike of foreign interventions in the affairs of the Empire, and to
Wallenstein a return to their former loyalty by Saxony and Brandenburg
automatically implied a switch to active hostilities against the Swedes or
other invaders. The electors and Arnim, on the other hand, were seeking
to find refuge in a face-saving neutrality, so that, joined by Wallenstein
to form a German third party, they could negotiate peace terms with
both the emperor and Sweden from a position of strength. The two
sides misunderstood these essential aspects of each other’s intentions,
and hence both felt deceived when Wallenstein’s eventual forcing of
the issue brought out into the open that the electors were not prepared
to join a military united front against the Swedes, while the generalis-
simo had no intention of being detached from the emperor.
In looking for explanations for this misunderstanding a useful
starting point is to note that there is no evidence that Wallenstein ever
intended either to act independently of the emperor or to coerce him
into making peace, whatever others claimed that he had said at various
times. Gallas took part in the first meeting with Arnim, other senior
officers were aware of the progress of discussions, Imperial councillors
were in Wallenstein’s camp for much of the late summer and attended
at least one of the meetings, while the emperor himself wrote to express
his approval of the proceedings.^31 If Wallenstein was playing a double
game it was very cleverly done. Nevertheless he may have spoken and
conducted himself with sufficient ambiguity in the early stages of the
parleying to allow Arnim to draw his own erroneous conclusions. It is
also possible that his position changed over the course of the discus-
sions. Early in the summer he might have settled for neutrality from
the electors, if this could have been agreed quickly, thus leaving him
free to use the campaigning season against the Swedes. Later in the
year, with the best months already wasted, he needed more. He needed
active participation in order to force the Swedes to withdraw to the
Baltic coast, thus laying the basis for real peace negotiations over the
winter. Wallenstein’s problem was that the longer the talking went on
the poorer his chances became of achieving a substantial improvement
in the Imperialist military position during 1633, and hence the lower
his own standing became at the Imperial court.