But Brutus Says He Was Ambitious 251for revenge after his Regensburg dismissal, depend essentially on unsup-
ported conspiracy theories. Thus it is claimed that although he had
always intended to resume his command he delayed doing so in order
to enjoy the discomfiture of his adversaries, and to wait for the military
position to become so desperate that he could name his own terms.
Actually all the indications are that he genuinely had no wish to return
to the army, and that he only did so when the Saxon invasion of Bohemia
posed a direct threat to his own principal remaining property, this being
the common thread between his military involvements in 1619, 1625
and 1631. Purportedly serious mention of the crown of Bohemia was
made only by the Swedes and the French, in propositions instigated by
exile intriguers, and according to their own report Wallenstein dismissed
the idea as ‘gross villainy’. Their other fantasies and Piccolomini’s fabri-
cations were too absurd to require further refutation.
One other aspect of Wallenstein’s career as a general which has
been interpreted as ambition was his effort to secure sole command,
extending his control first over the armies intended for service in the
Empire – in this context Germany – and then to all Imperialist forces
wherever they might be. In the process he acquired the rank of full
general previously reserved for the head of state, and the unprecedented
title of supreme commander or generalissimo. In 1633 he insisted that
were the Imperialist army and those of the Protestant electors to unite it
had to be under his control, and to the end he resisted the idea that he
might share command of the Imperialist army with the emperor’s son.
This was not, however, a matter of self-aggrandisement but of military
logic. Divided commands inevitably prevent the most effective utilisa-
tion of resources, while the complex and wide-ranging conflicts in which
the Imperialist forces were involved required a single strategic overview.
Part of the explanation for Gustavus’s military success was that as both
king and general he had exactly such a unified command, which he
also sought where possible to impose on his allies, and with their lesser
resources the Imperialists could not afford to be worse organised than
their opponents. Wallenstein and Gustavus also shared a common char-
acteristic of men of high ability in positions of power, that of believing
in themselves and in their capacity to perform their functions better
than any alternative candidate. In Wallenstein’s case this was certainly
true, as with a few brief exceptions the Imperialist military performance
during the Thirty Years War was generally poor both before and after his
period in command. He was not disposed to share control of the army
he had created and financed with the kind of old-school cavaliers who
had been responsible for the campaign which resulted in his narrow