A Scandal in Bohemia 29little choice but to follow suit, bringing 1619 to an end for military
purposes.
That was the limit of Bohemian success, as Ferdinand was beginning
to gather allies. Spain realised that active help was required to avoid
a Protestant defeat of the Empire, and Duke Maximilian I of Bavaria
was brought into the conflict by the promise of substantial rewards.
Maximilian, who was both Ferdinand’s cousin and his brother-in-law,
was head of the Catholic League, which like the Protestant Union had
become an enduring result of the confrontations in Germany more
than a decade earlier, and he controlled its army and its formidable
and highly experienced general, Tilly. In the spring John George of
Saxony also agreed to support Ferdinand, and the fate of the revolt
was sealed. In July 1620 Tilly moved into Upper Austria to neutralise
potential rebels there and to join up with Bucquoy. In August an army
from the Spanish Netherlands under General Ambrosio Spinola invaded
Frederick’s Palatinate (which lay on both sides of the Rhine extend-
ing from Heidelberg to beyond Mainz), and John George occupied
Lusatia, all with little resistance. Tilly and Bucquoy then advanced into
Bohemia, finally confronting the combined Bohemian and Palatinate
forces under Thurn and Prince Christian of Anhalt just outside Prague.
On 8 November 1620 the Imperialists gained a quick, complete and
decisive victory at the battle of the White Mountain, and Frederick,
henceforth known mockingly as the ‘winter king’ due to the brevity of
his reign, made a hasty and undignified escape the following day.
Wallenstein and his regiment were on active service throughout 1619
and 1620, apart from periods when he had bouts of the ill health which
troubled him for the rest of his life. It was during these two years that
he really learned his craft as a senior officer and future general, extend-
ing his combat experience and adding the grasp of management and
logistics which was the basis of his later success. He played no part in
the direction of the campaigns, and nor is he credited with any spec-
tacular exploits, either individually or with his regiment. Instead he
did what was required of him, and if we have no proof that he did so
bravely, reliably and competently we can at least infer this from the
additional responsibility that he was given at the end of 1619, and
the duties which were assigned to him towards and after the defeat of
the revolt late in 1620.
Line officers, colonels included, were expected to lead their men in
person when they went into battle, and the casualty list among the
higher ranks, both in the Bohemian campaign and later in the Thirty
Years War, testifies that they actually did so. Wallenstein had already