Richer Than All His Tribe 39formed, as is shown by previous debasements in Bohemia, one under
Frederick’s short-lived government and no less than three during 1621,
which progressively increased the number of gulden minted from a
mark of silver (a unit of weight), first from 19 to 27, then to 39, on to 46,
and again to 78. Moreover this inflation was rampant far beyond
Bohemia and Austria, being well documented across the Empire from
Saxony to Strasbourg and all points south.^6 The economic effect of war
is a far more credible culprit, aggravated by the actions of governments
in adulterating the coinage at a time when the mechanisms of inflation
were not fully understood. The new consortium effectively took over
the already established minting rate, specified at 79 gulden to the mark,
which had to cover payment of six million gulden to the exchequer for
the year’s contract and to allow the contractors some scope for profit
themselves. It has been argued that the consortium stoked inflation by
greatly increasing the money supply through the issue of 42 million
gulden in the year, 30 million in the first few months, although it has
also to be said that the main call for this money came from the Imperial
government itself. The consortium certainly had to issue its coins as
quickly as possible, because debasement is not only a response to but
also a cause of inflation in a classic vicious circle. Hence it drove up the
cash price of silver, an increase to which the consortium’s own high
level of demand will have contributed. As a result de Witte’s agents had
to seek supplies in financial markets across Europe to meet the require-
ments. Well before the end of the year the scheme ceased to be profit-
able, and as renewal terms could not be agreed it came to an end in
February 1623. In December of that year the government carried out a
currency reform, calling in the debased coins and issuing new ones with
something like the original silver content at a rate of one for six.^7
The official investigation has left only a couple of tables of figures in
the archives, and as these are of dubious origin and are not internally
consistent no firm conclusions as to the profits made by the consortium
can be drawn. It appears that the individual members supplied vary-
ing amounts of silver, and were credited for it at very different average
prices, with the impressive names being paid much more per mark than
the real principals. Their personal profits depended mainly on what the
silver had actually cost them, which increased with inflation as the year
went on. Calculations based on reasoned assumptions suggest that the
contract may have been set up with an expected average silver price of
around 55 gulden per mark, as against possibly 40 or less at the outset
and apparently in excess of the minting rate of 79 towards the end.
However de Witte supplied more than 70 per cent of the silver and was