76 Wallenstein
that he needed to act, and to goad Ferdinand and his council into
acting, if he was to preserve his own property and position. In the latter
part of 1624 he renewed his suggestion that he should raise a consider-
able force, now to be a full-scale army, for the emperor, which as previ-
ously he did through his contacts rather than making a formal written
proposal, and with Harrach’s support he pressed this idea urgently on
Ferdinand and his advisers.
The Imperial council was not easy to persuade.^9 Some members agreed
that there was a need to raise forces to counter the threat from the
north, but others felt that arming against the possibility of a renewed
and larger war could make this a self-fulfilling prophecy. It was difficult
and expensive to keep a large army idle, so that raising one tended of
itself to lead towards war. An inactive army was also a danger to its own
side, as its food and fodder requirements quickly stripped any territory
in which it was based. This and the notorious indiscipline of the troops
could cause severe economic damage and perhaps lead to civil distur-
bances in the emperor’s own lands. Better to wait until an attack was
more certain, said some – but that, said others, including Wallenstein,
would be too late.
Then there was the man himself. Although he had a number of per-
sonal opponents from Bohemia there was no wider hostility towards
Wallenstein at the Imperial court. That developed later. His loyalty and
military competence were well established and were not questioned in
the council discussions. Nevertheless a year earlier he had only been
third-in-command of the small force that took refuge in Göding. The
military hierarchy in Vienna, mostly Spanish or Italian, could not
overlook that, and at 41 Wallenstein was still considered young to
command an army. Money was the crux. Whatever the advisability of
raising troops the emperor did not have the resources to do so, as the
Imperial treasury was already loaded down with debt after the previous
years of war. Wallenstein appeared to be willing and able to finance the
recruitment and equipping of an army, and perhaps even to fund its
subsequent costs, without calling on the exchequer for cash.^10 No-one
else was. Thus the issue was simply Wallenstein’s army or no army. This
too caused uneasiness in Vienna, as ‘Wallenstein’s army’ sounded rather
like a private army, calling to mind Mansfeld’s, which was well known
to be loyal to its general rather than to the ruler employing its services.
And how long would it be before Wallenstein’s money ran out and the
bills came back to the exchequer?
The truth was that Wallenstein could no more afford to maintain
an army than could the emperor. His resources and credit could, and