Go, Captain, Greet the Danish King 83independent rather than united action. Although this was making a
virtue of necessity it was nevertheless a sound strategy, as by separating
they prevented Tilly and Wallenstein from combining against them.
Mansfeld’s task was to draw Wallenstein away by heading east into
Silesia, forcing him – so the plan went – to follow because of the threat
this would pose to Bohemia, Moravia and ultimately Austria itself. As
in 1623 the intention was that this force from the west would join up
with Bethlen Gabor invading from the east, when together they would
be strong enough to face and defeat Wallenstein. Meanwhile Christian
of Brunswick was to bypass Tilly and move south, before turning and
threatening his rear while Christian of Denmark confronted him from
the north.
It was not a bad plan, and it also exploited the equally predictable ten-
sions between Tilly and Wallenstein, the old, experienced and successful
general and the younger unproven leader of a new and unproven army.^1
Rivalry over winter quarters had been the start, but Wallenstein had
come off better by moving quickly into the rich lands of the Protestant-
held secularised bishoprics centred on Magdeburg and Halberstadt.
With Wallenstein thus ensconced by the Elbe, Tilly remained 80 miles
to the west on the River Weser, a disposition which determined their
respective roles in the campaigns of 1626. There were also differences
over strategy. Wallenstein wanted their forces to join up for a decisive
attack on Christian early in the year, whereas Tilly preferred to play
a waiting game, hoping to trap the Danes between them later in the
spring. Wallenstein, closer to Christian’s main army, was thus left at
risk should the king move first and attack him in strength.^2 The result
was that while the generals were arguing the relative importance of pos-
sible lines of attack or defence, each seeking support and troops from
the other, they lost the initiative and were forced instead to respond to
the opening moves of their enemies. Tilly was soon under pressure, and
when the ‘mad Halberstädter’ threatened the city of Goslar Wallenstein
was obliged to assist by leading a large force against him, only to find
that the enemy quickly disappeared. He then had to turn back to coun-
ter an advance south by a Danish division under General Hans Fuchs,
which he chased off after a sharp skirmish but without being able to
force a battle.^3 Meanwhile Mansfeld was already across the Elbe.
Rivers were of great strategic importance, not only as the easiest line
of advance or retreat using the relatively good roads alongside them, but
also as supply lines for bringing up heavy guns, provisions and other
necessities by water. However major rivers were also potentially danger-
ous obstacles, particularly to a retreating army, as bridges were few and