86 Wallenstein
approached was well screened from Mansfeld on the opposite side. The
fortifications would have largely hidden the bridge itself from him, and
Aldringer had also covered it with tree branches, so that troops cross-
ing could not be seen.^6 The land north of the river where Mansfeld
made his camp and positioned his forces was much more open, but
he had thrown up temporary earthworks opposite and parallel to the
Imperialist defences. To the east a belt of woodland started from the
river close to the Imperialist right wing, extending northwards and
then westwards so that it effectively bounded the whole of Mansfeld’s
left flank.
Mansfeld’s initial probes in early April and a more substantial attack
a week later showed that although Aldringer had only a small garrison
the position had been too well prepared to be easily taken. Mansfeld
accordingly brought up guns and set his men to digging approach
trenching for a full-scale storm of the bridgehead. His reasons are not
well established, but if his plan was to draw Wallenstein after him
into Silesia he would have needed a head start so that he could reach
Bethlen Gabor before Wallenstein caught up with him. Taking the
bridge and leaving a rearguard to defend it would have helped to pre-
vent the Imperial army following too hard on his heels. Christian of
Denmark was also worried that Mansfeld’s departure would weaken
his own position, so that he wanted him first to hamper Wallenstein
by cutting his supply line along the river and opening up a potential
threat to his rear.^7 Fuchs was charged with supporting the action, but
he was still recovering from his own clash with Wallenstein, so that he
did not appear on the scene. Hence Mansfeld launched the attack on his
own, perhaps tempted by the opportunity of an easy victory over the
heavily outnumbered Aldringer. His career had been remarkable more
for his ability to recover from setbacks and survive disasters than for
any achievements in the field, and he may have wanted a triumph to
register with Christian. Successive failed attacks seem only to have made
him the more determined to persevere, and to have made him oblivious
to the changing balance of forces around the bridge.
Mansfeld’s perversity was Wallenstein’s opportunity. It had been a
frustrating winter, and he was well aware that critics in Vienna were
saying that in the six months since the novice general set out with
his new army nothing of consequence had been achieved. Now there
was a chance of action. He could not move too early in case the attack
on the bridge was a diversion as part of some larger plan, but once
Mansfeld brought in artillery and his main army Wallenstein was ready