Shia, which shaped the character of political and military organisa-
tion. Within the Hazarajat, there were a number of competitors for
leadership: Harpviken identifies them as the mir, the sayyid, the
sheikh, and the Radical Islamist (Harpviken, 1996: 28). The mir
was a traditional leader, of a type more commonly known else-
where as khan, malik or arbab, depending upon the particular roles
played; the sayyid was a member of the Prophet’s family; the
sheikh was a traditional religious dignitary; and the Radical Islamist
had typically been energised by the Iranian revolution. The Shura-i
Ettefaqcame to be dominated by sayyids, although many were also
sheikhs. However, the internal politics of the Hazarajat were to be
complicated by the reluctance of the Kabul regime or the USSR to
commit scarce resources to a remote and isolated region of limited
importance to their overall strategy. Kabul seemed as far away as
ever, and this deprived the locals of an external enemy against
which they needed to unite. This freed them to confront each other,
which they did with a vengeance from 1982.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE REGIME AND THE ROLE OF THE
PARTY
The limited autonomy of the Karmal regime
In examining the form of regime which the Soviets sought to
defend by military means, it is important first of all to appreciate
that its autonomy was limited. In this respect it followed a model
which had come to apply in a number of the states of Eastern
Europe in which Communist regimes had been installed in the
aftermath of the Second World War, namely Poland, East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. These states were mem-
bers of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (commonly known as the
Warsaw Pact) which provided for integrated military command;
they were members of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (commonly known as COMECON) which provided for
a degree of economic integration; and most importantly, they were
The Karmal Period, 1979–1986 91