satisfaction. By the last three years of Brezhnev’s rule (1979–82), it
is likely that the USSR was already experiencing a decline in out-
put (Harrison, 1993). Poverty was far more serious a problem than
official statistics suggested (Matthews, 1986).
Second, a significant turnover in the Soviet elite was underway.
In 1980, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin died; his
replacement, Nikolai Tikhonov, was barely a year his junior. In
January 1982, the conservative, incorruptible Party Secretary for
ideology, Mikhail A. Suslov, died at the age of 79; he had been a
party secretary since 1949. His successor was Andropov, who left
the KGB in order to become a party secretary and position himself
for still higher office. Brezhnev himself died in November 1982,
after some years in which his mental powers had been declining
markedly (Brown, 1996: 53–4; Gorbachev, 1996: 108–39), and
was succeeded by Andropov. This led to a period of some turmoil
as Andropov, finally unleashed by Brezhnev’s demise, moved
against some of Brezhnev’s corrupt long-term associates, includ-
ing Interior Minister Schelokov, and the party First Secretary
in Uzbekistan (and candidate Politburo member) Sharaf
Rashidov. However, Andropov, 68 when he assumed the General
Secretaryship, suffered failing health through much of 1983, and
finally died of kidney disease in February 1984. In what ultimate-
ly paved the way for a new leadership generation, the Politburo
opted for the increasingly feeble Konstantin Chernenko as General
Secretary; his performance was so execrable that upon his death, a
clear majority in the Politburo favoured a generational change,
which came about with the elevation to the General Secretaryship
of Mikhail Gorbachev. The tensions within the leadership during
the 1982–85 transition phase were considerable, and militated
against decisive actions being taken, even when Andropov was
inclined to act firmly.
Third, East–West relations were in a frigid condition. Some have
gone as far as to label the period after the invasion of Afghanistan a
‘Second Cold War’. Halliday argues that by the latter part of 1980,
it was clear to the Soviet leadership that the ‘international cost’ of
the invasion of Afghanistan, ‘above all in relations with the US, was
104 The Afghanistan Wars