Grachev, was ‘a genetic error of the system’ (Brown, 1996: 88).
Karmal was entirely orthodox, and incapable of responding to cir-
cumstances outside the framework of his stale ideological commit-
ments. Gorbachev was a man of notable energy and drive, whereas
Karmal was notable for his lethargy. And Gorbachev had a stable
and happy personal life, while Karmal was a drunkard (Rubin,
1995a: 125, 320) whose long-term liaison with Dr Anahita
Ratebzad was a matter of grotesque notoriety in Kabul. It is hard-
ly surprising that Gorbachev found Karmal a substandard leader.
Gorbachev had not been part of the Kremlin leadership group
which took the decision to invade Afghanistan, and once he
became General Secretary, he had no particular personal reason to
defend the decision. His approach to Afghanistan depended rather
upon a calculation of the costs and benefits of the commitment in
the mid-1980s, both for his own political programme, and for the
state which he led. He did not take long to make up his mind.
While he was prepared to give the military one more chance to
deliver success on the ground (Bradsher, 1999: 275), in November
1985 he invited Karmal to ‘forget socialism’ (Chernyaev,
2000: 42), and at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union in February 1986, he pointedly referred to
Afghanistan as a ‘bleeding wound’ (krovotochashchaia rana)
(Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1986: 69). Karmal was
exceedingly reluctant to respond to these signals, for he clearly
appreciated the oblivion that awaited an ex-leader of his stripe. In
February 1986, he put on a bravado performance for a visiting
Western journalist, whose report with hindsight seems somewhat
surreal: ‘Relaxed and looking well, the Afghan President laughed
at Western diplomatic rumours that his health is failing. “I must
have heard 10 times that I’ve been killed on various foreign radio
broadcasts. I’m alive. I’m fighting. I’m working – with a cool head
and a warm heart”, he said, patting his chest’ (Steele, 1986: 7).
But the writing was indelibly on the wall. Anatoly Dobrynin was
witness to the final meeting between Gorbachev and Karmal:
‘Gorbachev told Karmal point-blank that he should cede his pos-
ition to Najibullah and take up residence in Moscow, where his
106 The Afghanistan Wars