The radicalism of this approach should not be underestimated. It
had across-the-board implications, shaping Moscow’s approach to
relations with the USA, to developing countries, to China, and to
the Eastern Bloc. It had echoes of Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful coexist-
ence’, but without the latter’s underlying sense of ongoing compe-
tition between capitalist and socialist systems. And in 1988, after
the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was announced,
Gorbachev in two major speeches identified ‘freedom of choice’ as
a universal principle (Brown, 1996: 225). Times had certainly
changed.
Najibullah’s consolidation of power
Najibullah’s energy and dynamism may have made him seem an
obvious choice in Moscow as Karmal’s replacement, but in party
circles in Kabul he was a controversial figure. He was despised by
the Khalqfaction, doubtless one reason why Soviet tanks surround-
ed Gulabzoi’s Interior Ministry in Kabul during the Central
Committee plenum at which Karmal was formally replaced.
However, he was also regarded with profound suspicion by mem-
bers of his own Parcham faction. His KhAD background was
doubtless one factor at work here: secret police chiefs – Himmler
and Beria being prime examples – are often viewed with a certain
horror by their more squeamish colleagues. This created something
of a vicious circle. With a weak base in the party, it was natural for
Najibullah to continue to rely on KhAD, but since KhAD was an
instrument of coercion and widely recognised as one, it was a poor
base from which to try to secure any kind of legitimacy. In seeking
to consolidate his position, Najibullah was confronted with chal-
lenges at two different levels. The first was that of the communist
leadership in Afghanistan. Here, his position was, at a superficial
reading, not so difficult. He enjoyed the full backing of the Soviet
leadership, especially the KGB (Arnold, 1993: 150–2), and had
indeed been recommended as Karmal’s successor by the Soviet
security organs (Dobrynin, 1995: 442). Except through assassin-
ation, he was in no danger of removal. However, unless he
The Najibullah-Gorbachev Period 1986–1989 117