an instrument of policy. Its aim was to create the imageof a con-
stitutionalist order.
Substantively, the policy of ‘national reconciliation’ involved
explicit obeisance to the importance of private sector activity in the
economy, and of the ‘sacred’ religion of Islam as the religion of
Afghanistan. ‘Our revolution’, Najibullah stated in October 1987, ‘is
not a proletarian or a socialist revolution’ (BBC Summary of World
BroadcastsFE/8707/C/1, 24 October 1987). These paralleled devel-
opments in the USSR under perestroika, where experiments with
‘cooperatives’ were underway, and systematic religious persecution
by the KGB had largely disappeared. However, many of these
avowed elements of ‘national reconciliation’ were not that different
from what Karmal had proposed in the course of his failed attempts
to legitimate the regime. And Giustozzi has rightly noted that ‘most
of what Najibullah was throwing away was the dreamsof “modern-
izing” the Afghan countryside, rather than the reality’ (Giustozzi,
2000: 168). Najibullah had hinted at this himself when he declared
that ‘We are weak in the tactical and practical sphere. Most of the
grand thoughts and plans get drowned in mere words and remain on
paper’ (BBC Summary of World BroadcastsFE/8260/C/1–2, 16 May
1986).
Personnel changes were also part of the policy. The aim was
essentially that of decapitating the opposition by coopting its key
leaders into the regime. A first step was the induction of ‘non-party
figures’ into ostensibly significant offices. On 26 May 1988, Dr
Muhammad Hasan Sharq replaced Keshtmand as Chairman of the
Council of Ministers. Much was made of his non-party back-
ground, but to most Afghan observers, Sharq was a longstanding
fellow traveller with the Parchamfaction, and it was almost cer-
tainly his reliability which led to his appointment. The Soviet
Union regarded him with scorn – in a report to the Soviet
Politburo on 23 January 1989, a high-level Soviet commission
described the actions of Sharq and many of his ministers as
‘Feeble, to say the least’ (Hershberg, 1996–97: 182). Sharq
remained in office for less than a year. Other offices were
identified as available to those prepared to join a ‘government of
122 The Afghanistan Wars