national unity’ as part of Najibullah’s readiness ‘officially and in
practice, to share power’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
FE/8622/C/2, 17 July 1987). A careful reading of the list showed
that the Defence, Interior, and State Security ministries – what one
might call the ‘power ministries’ – were excluded.
Finally, as part of the ‘national reconciliation’ policy, Najibullah
announced a ‘ceasefire’ of six months from 15 January 1987,
which in July he announced would be extended for a further six
months. However, the fine print permitted ‘crushing blows’ in
retaliation, and the resistance regarded the ceasefire as a complete
sham. It certainly did not lead to any significant cessation of firing.
Obstacles to ‘national reconciliation’
A number of serious barriers stood in the way of the policy of
‘national reconciliation’. The policy was being pursued from a
slender territorial and institutional base. In areas outside the
regime’s control, it was difficult for the regime to spread its mes-
sage except through radio broadcasts, given the shortage of skilled
cadres, and some important areas were so firmly under the control
of particular resistance groups that they were to all intents and pur-
poses inaccessible. But more seriously, the regime faced a problem
of credibility. Memories of the boorish intrusions of party activists
into rural areas in 1978–79 were still relatively fresh, and did noth-
ing to enhance the prospects for ‘national reconciliation’, although
the specific content of the new messages was of course quite dif-
ferent.
A particular credibility problem arose from Najibullah’s deter-
mination to retain effective control of events, which sapped ‘nation-
al reconciliation’ of any real political content. Part of his problem
was that it was difficult to move at a faster pace than his patrons in
the USSR: only on 13 March 1990 was ‘the leading and guiding
role’ of the Communist Party expunged by the new Congress of
People’s Deputies from Article 6 of the SovietConstitution. The
limited scope of what Najibullah had to offer was apparent from his
speeches, many of them broadcast to the Afghan people. In his
The Najibullah-Gorbachev Period 1986–1989 123