Before concluding discussion of this decision, it is necessary to
discuss one important thesis about it which has recently been
advanced by Sarah E. Mendelson in her book Changing Course:
Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Mendelson notes three kinds of explanation for the withdrawal.
The first looks at events in the international system as a source
of change. However, Mendelson maintains that these were
indeterminate, as the Soviet leadership could have responded to
them in different ways. The second refers to different kinds of
learning. One interpretation might be that ‘the Soviet image of
the opponents – both the mujahideen and the United States –
changed as a result of disconfirming and overwhelming informa-
tion about the war and the international system’ (Mendelson,
1998: 25). Another might be that the Soviet leadership withdrew
on a ‘tactical learning’ basis ‘simply because they were getting
beaten’ (Mendelson, 1998: 27). She finds neither of these inter-
pretations plausible in the light of her reading of the evidence.
Her preference is for a third explanation focusing on the interplay
of ideas and politics, which she concludes are ‘necessary and suf-
ficient variables for explaining the change in Soviet foreign pol-
icy in the 1980s and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan’
(Mendelson, 1998: 38). Here, she credits Gorbachev with using
‘coalition-building strategies... within traditional institutions to
bring about change and the empowerment of a dominant commu-
nity of experts that helped ensure an alternative source of
legitimacy and power for the reformist agenda’ (Mendelson,
1998: 37).
There is clearly substance in the view that the foreign policy
process underwent significant change under Gorbachev, both in
terms of personnel and legitimating ideology. However,
Mendelson’s specific thesis about the importance of expertsdoes
not stand up well in the face of the evidence (for more detail, see
Maley, 1999a). She writes that ‘the bulk of the specialists were
not consulted until late 1986 and through the spring and summer
of 1987’ (Mendelson, 1998: 125), and concludes that ‘the leader-
ship’s decision in principle to withdraw seems to have been
132 The Afghanistan Wars