appointed in February 1981 by UN Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim to be his Personal Representative. On 22 February 1982,
following the election of Pérez de Cuéllar to the position of
Secretary-General, the position was assumed by Diego Cordovez
of Ecuador, who had been appointed Under-Secretary-General for
Special Political Affairs on 1 August 1981. Between 1982 and
1984, the communications took the form of ‘shuttle talks’, with the
mediator travelling between capitals to pass on the positions of the
different parties. From August 1984, the negotiations took the form
of ‘proximity talks’, in which the participating parties occupied
rooms at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, between which UN
officials oscillated. This peculiar arrangement was necessary
because of Pakistan’s resolute refusal to agree to any measure
which might be interpreted as according de factorecognition to the
regime put in place and sustained by Soviet troops (see Khan,
1991; Cordovez and Harrison, 1995; Rubin, 1995b).
The shape which the Geneva Accords were to take was fore-
shadowed – and some might go so far as to say determined – in a
statement issued by the Karmal regime on 14 May 1980. The pro-
posals of course originated from Moscow: three hours after the
statement’s broadcast in Pushto by Kabul Radio, an English text
with additions was issued by the Soviet newsagency TASS. The
statement outlined proposals for a ‘political solution’ to the ‘ten-
sion that has come about in this region’ (BBC Summary of World
BroadcastsFE/6421/C/1–3, 16 May 1980). Cordovez subsequently
observed that it was ‘widely felt at the U.N. that the proposals
should be ignored or rejected as insincere’ (Cordovez and
Harrison, 1995: 74). However, the programme which the 14 May
statement proposed was mirrored in the agenda of talks under UN
auspices, which covered the withdrawal of ‘the foreign troops’,
non-interference in the internal affairs of states, international guar-
antees, and the voluntary repatriation of refugees.
The participation in the talks of delegations from the Kabul
regime and the Government of Pakistan gave the talks a faintly
surreal dimension, for the number of relevant parties was much
larger. The Soviet Union, of course, was heavily involved just off-
136 The Afghanistan Wars