the kind of arrangements which they were contemplating would be
at odds with the President’s intuitive commitment to back anti-
Soviet forces in the Third World, and would be challenged by the
Mujahideen’s supporters. The impasse was overcome tacitly rather
than explicitly: to coincide with the signing of the Accords, the US
Administration issued a statement that ‘The obligations undertaken
by the guarantors [the USA and the USSR] are symmetrical. In this
regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the U.S.
retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to pro-
vide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet
Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in
Afghanistan, the U.S. similarly will exercise restraint’ (Department
of State Bulletin, 88, 2135: 55, June 1988).
In Pakistan too there was a hiccup, as President Zia became sud-
denly uneasy at the absence of any mechanism for transition in
Afghanistan to a government with normative legitimacy. The
Soviets’ desire for an accord to provide a dignified cover for their
retreat from Afghanistan gave Pakistan a certain amount of leverage,
and Zia was keen to exploit it. However, once the US
Administration decided to accept the Accords, it brought pressure to
bear on Pakistan to do the same, also exploiting a sharp divergence
of opinion on the matter between Zia and Junejo (Rubin, 1995b: 89).
(Zia dismissed Junejo on 29 May 1988.) The Accords were finally
signed at a ceremony at the Palais des Nationson 14 April 1988.
Najibullah’s Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil signed on Kabul’s behalf.
Pakistan’s signature was recorded by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
Zain Noorani, and George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze repre-
sented the USA and the USSR respectively. The only speaker was
the UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar, and Noorani and Wakil
avoided eye contact. The mood was funereal rather than euphoric,
for the gaps in the Accords were almost as striking as their content.
The content of the Geneva Accords
The Accords consisted of four distinct but integrally related texts.
The first was entitled Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of
The Road to Soviet Withdrawal 139