was a theatrical prop in the final scene of a drawn-out drama, part
of the raft of measures designed to ease the USSR out of
Afghanistan with minimum humiliation.
The signing of the Geneva Accords also triggered a rush to
establish institutions for the delivery of postwar reconstruction
assistance, with a particular focus on refugee repatriation. On 11
May 1988, the Secretary-General appointed Sadruddin Aga Khan,
who had served as United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees from 1965 to 1977, to head the Office of the United
Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance
Programmes Relating to Afghanistan (UNOCA). On 10 June 1988,
the Secretary-General issued an appeal for funds for Afghanistan,
with targets of US$1.116 billion for relief and rehabilitation needs
for 1988–89, and a further US$839.6 million for rehabilitation and
recovery in the period 1990–93 (UNOCA, 1988: 14). The appeal
in its details was quite detached from ground realities. For exam-
ple, for mine action it solicited a meagre US$9 million, only a tiny
fraction of what would eventually be required. But its greatest
detachment from reality came with the claim that the Geneva
Accords ‘provide for a political settlement to enable the people of
Afghanistan and the international community to embark on a major
co-operative and co-ordinated effort to bring humanitarian relief
and sound economic recovery to Afghanistan and all of its people’
(UNOCA, 1988: 9–10). This was even more florid and inaccurate
than the claim made by Pérez de Cuéllar on the day the Accords
were signed – and markedly more dangerous. For in this case,
scarce resources were being sought not because the need was man-
ifest, but rather to substantiate the myth that the Geneva Accords
had addressed all the fundamental issues over which Afghans were
divided. The weaknesses of this approach were soon all too appar-
ent: the expected repatriation of refugees did not occur, ongoing
conflict blocked large-scale reconstruction, and donors rapidly
became fatigued. The UNOCA mission became caught in ferocious
turf battles between different UN agencies, and found its functions
steadily reduced to the mundane. The problems by which UN
development assistance was afflicted, searingly documented in
144 The Afghanistan Wars