tives, but usually defend themselves on different bases, either in
terms of intraparty devices for consultation (‘democratic central-
ism’) or of the unique insight or understanding enjoyed by a party
leadership by virtue of its character. In certain circumstances, how-
ever, such claims can be sorely tested, and manifest policy failure
is one of these. Sometimes, the response to such failure is an escal-
ation of coercion, so that no one dares point out the party’s weak-
nesses. However, the situation becomes much more dangerous
where the loss of faith occurs not at the mass level (or the mass
levelonly), but penetrates the middle or even upper echelons of the
party itself. This was what happened in the case of Afghanistan.
The process by which the decision to intervene was taken was so
much at odds with the informal norms of consultation which had
built up during the Brezhnev era, and with any notion of intraparty
consultation, that it was tailor-made for those within the party who
wished to pursue a reformist course. It was notthe only such issue,
but it was probably the easiest to exploit. Failure in economic pol-
icy, for example, can have complex causes, and it may be difficult
to sheet home the blame to a small leadership group. Where an
invasion decision has been taken by a small group of hierarchs
without ‘proper’ consultation, it is much harder to persuade oneself
that the system which allows such decision making is beyond
reproach.
The erosion of the Brezhnev Doctrine
The war in Afghanistan struck a fundamental blow to the Brezhnev
Doctrine. The Soviet Union for decades previously had been pre-
pared to use force outside its borders to defend what the Soviet
leadership perceived as core interests. This use of force was not as
rampant as some conservative analysts painted it as being, but it
had permitted the consolidation in Eastern Europe of a glacis of
dependent states whose populations, witnessing the invasions of
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, had few illusions
about the fate that would await them if they too proved restive.
But on occasion, a passionate desire for freedom could override
Consequences of the Soviet–Afghan War 161