- The SCUD missile had certain features which protected it
from Stinger missiles in the hands of the resistance: it was a proper
guided missile with mechanisms to correct ballistic trajectory, and
its warhead hit at speeds well above the speed of sound
(Cordesman and Wagner, 1990: 163). A detailed study of missile
use in Afghanistan concluded that the number of missile launches
between the signing of the Geneva Accords and the collapse of
Najibullah’s regime exceeded the total of ‘all ballistic missiles
fired in anger since the end of the Second World War’ (Bermudez,
1992: 51). The total value of aid to the communist regime in the
post-withdrawal period was credibly estimated at US$300 million a
month (Isby, 1991), with one report suggesting that arms deliveries
alone in the six months following the withdrawal were worth
US$1.4 billion (Coll, 1989).
Militias and segmentary politics
Resources supplied from the USSR, together with the printing of
more Afghan money, gave the regime some scope to buy off influ-
ential local commanders. As Barnett R. Rubin noted, this was
extraordinarily expensive, with ‘containers’ of banknotes being
sent to regime supporters (Rubin, 1995a: 161). None the less, it
worked in the short term, as a number of commanders were con-
tent to accept Kabul’s money, secure in the knowledge that in the
long term they retained the option to defect to the opposition. This
reflects the fundamental fragility of support purchased with cur-
rency: it tends to last only as long as the currency flow can be sus-
tained. To address this problem, Najibullah made use of militias
drawn from ethnic or sectarian minorities. The two most signifi-
cant of these were an Ismaili Shiite militia from Baghlan loyal to
Sayed Mansur Nadiri, and the so-called ‘Jawzjani’ Uzbek militia
loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostam, which technically functioned as the
53rd Division of the Army, but worked directly for Najibullah and
consisted of volunteers who were paid in accordance with results
(Dorronsoro, 2000: 226). In each of these cases, the lure of state
patronage proved irresistible to groups which had been either mar-
170 The Afghanistan Wars