the Mujahideen also suffered from a loss of international support,
at a crucial juncture, which adversely affected their combat per-
formance. Some fighters were simply war-weary, and less interest-
ed in eliminating remote Afghan communists than alien Soviet
invaders (Rubin, 1995a: 247). Finally, Hekmatyar’s ambitions
thwarted efforts to act concertedly.
Resistance tensions: Jalalabad and Farkhar
A very clear indication that not all was well with the resistance
came barely a month after the completion of the Soviet troop with-
drawal, when an attempt to seize the city of Jalalabad failed badly.
Initially, the attack led Najibullah to make a panicky request to the
Soviet leadership for airstrikes from Soviet bases against the resist-
ance (Chernyaev, 2000: 207). Given the widespread belief that
Najibullah’s days were numbered, the Jalalabad operation had an
extremely adverse impact on resistance morale, and concomitantly
boosted the morale of the regime. Predictably, the problem which
thwarted the entire operation was one of coordination. Massoud
later stated that he learned of the attack on Jalalabad only from a
BBC broadcast, and that it took place ‘when most of the country
was covered with snow’ (AFGHANews, 1 October 1989: 6). In the
vicinity of Jalalabad, too, there were significant problems of com-
munication between different groups of Mujahideen. The defensive
positions of the regime held; convoys slipped through to the city,
reducing pressure on the defenders; SCUD missiles had a psycho-
logical impact even though they were not especially accurate; and
massacres of surrendering regime forces by Arab extremists in the
attackers’ ranks (Rubin, 1989–90: 155) provided a disincentive for
others to consider defection. After 3–4 months, the operation simply
fizzled out, with the regime still in control of Jalalabad.
Were the Mujahideen leaders properly consulted before the ope-
ration? Some writers claim so (Yousaf and Adkin, 1992: 227), but
Bradsher argues that the decision to launch the attack ‘was taken in
Islamabad on 5 March at a meeting of Pakistani officials attended by
United States Ambassador Robert B. Oakley but not by any
The Interregnum of Najibullah, 1989–1992 175