mujahideenofficials’ (Bradsher, 1999: 346). However, one source
which he cites looked suspiciously like an ISI attempt to shift blame
on to other policy circles, with the claim that General Naseerullah
Babar, a close aide to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was respon-
sible (Kamm, 1989). While Babar was in time to prove himself at
least as maladroit as General Hamid Gul as far as Afghan policy was
concerned, it seems unlikely that he would have been able to out-
flank the head of the ISI on this issue, and other well-placed sources
attest to Gul’s involvement (Yousaf and Adkin, 1992: 227).
In any case, no one doubts that Pakistani misreading of the situ-
ation in Afghanistan had much to do with the shambles which even-
tuated. This partly reflected a misunderstanding of the capabilities of
the resistance (see Yousaf and Adkin, 1992: 230–1), but also a cer-
tain blatancy as to objective: the refusal of many resistance groups
to cooperate with the ISI arose, as Henry S. Bradsher put it, ‘from a
perception that Jalalabad was an ISI effort to defeat Najibullah so it
could install its favourite, the Ghilzai Pushtun, Hekmatyar, in Kabul.
Few Ghilzais outside his party, and still fewer Durrani Pushtuns,
Tajiks, or other Afghans wanted to die for that’ (Bradsher, 1999:
345–6). The ISI never seemed to learn that in Afghanistan, it is bet-
ter to coordinate through consultation than through decree. The
blame for the failure fell on General Gul, who was removed as
Director-General of ISI and returned to an Army position.
The tensions which were smouldering at the time of the
Jalalabad campaign flared openly on 9 July 1989, in what came
to be known as the Farkhar massacre. Thirty commanders asso-
ciated with Massoud’s Shura-i Nazar – including Dr Sayed
Husain, Commander Sar Malim Tariq, Commander Islamuddin,
Commander Abdul Wadood, and Mawlawi Ezatullah – were mur-
dered by a commander from Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islaminamed
Sayed Jamal. The killings occurred as they returned from a meet-
ing which had planned an attack on Kunduz, and manifestly
reflected Hekmatyar’s desire to cripple a rival party (Weintraub,
1989). Faced with widespread condemnation by other resistance
leaders, and the threat of formal expulsion from their ranks,
Hekmatyar archly withdrew from the ‘Interim Government’, claim-
176 The Afghanistan Wars