regime. Shevardnadze in February 1990 had outlined a framework
for regime transition in Afghanistan which proved a workable basis
for further US-Soviet dialogue (Shevardnadze, 1990), and in
December 1990, the Soviets and the USA came very close to an
agreement, with broad consensus on the need for a cutoff in
weapons supplies, and a UN-sponsored transitional process. Under
pressure from hardliners, Shevardnadze lacked the ability to close a
deal by setting firm dates, and with his resignation later that month,
the process came to a halt (Rubin, 1995b: 109–10). However, the
outcome of the Gulf War was a striking setback not only for Saddam
Hussein, but for figures such as Hekmatyar and in particular General
Mirza Aslam Beg, who had bizarrely misjudged what was likely to
happen (Rubin, 1995b: 113–14). This weakening of those most
strongly committed to a military solution set the scene for the United
Nations to renew its involvement in the Afghanistan situation.
UN ATTEMPTS TO MANAGE TRANSITION
In late 1989, Diego Cordovez relinquished his position as the
Secretary-General’s Personal Representative for Afghanistan in
order to become Foreign Minister of Ecuador (which in October
1990 established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with
Najibullah’s regime). This briefly left the Head of UNOCA,
Sadruddin Aga Khan, as the UN’s most prominent official dealing
with Afghanistan. However, it was to prove an uneasy position to
occupy. Funding problems rapidly became critical (Maley, 1989a:
126–7) as the expected mass repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan
following the Soviet troop withdrawal simply did not occur. As an
Ismaili Shia, Prince Sadruddin was regarded with a certain suspi-
cion by various resistance groups, given the support which Nadiri’s
Ismaili Shiite militia had given to Kabul; and great offence sprang
from the perception that UNOCA had vetoed the use of dogs in
mine clearance operations on the grounds that ‘animals’ should not
be put at risk to solve problems caused by humans, implying that
Afghans were less valuable than dogs (McGrath, 2000: 150). His
180 The Afghanistan Wars