notion that one could establish ‘Zones of Tranquillity’ in ‘the areas
where fighting has ceased’ (Sadruddin Aga Khan, 1990) was also
poorly received by the resistance parties, who interpreted it as an
attempt to limit their scope for tactical manoeuvre in the ongoing
struggle against Najibullah’s regime; in some cases it actually
caused fighting to flare up (Donini, 1996: 37). Sadruddin finally
resigned in frustration in December 1990. This provided an oppor-
tunity to unify the UN’s political and humanitarian activities. On 15
March 1990, the Secretary-General had established the Office of the
Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP), and
appointed a UN official, Benon Sevan, to head it. From 1 January
1991, Sevan was also appointed to head UNOCA. He was to have
an uncommonly interesting time in office.
The Secretary-General’s May 1991 plan
On 21 May 1991, following extensive discussions between Afghan
actors and Benon Sevan, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar issued
a new statement on Afghanistan (Pérez de Cuéllar, 1991). It was
deliberately cast in general terms, with a good deal of material
included that would be quite uncontroversial. The key paragraphs
read as follows:
I believe that the following elements would serve as a good
basis for a political settlement in Afghanistan, acceptable to the
vast majority of the Afghan people:
1 The necessity of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, political independence and non-aligned and Islamic char-
acter of Afghanistan.
2 The recognition of the right of the Afghan people to deter-
mine their own form of Government and to choose their eco-
nomic, political and social system, free from outside
intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind
whatsoever.
3 The need for a transition period, details of which have to be
worked out and agreed upon through an intra-AfghanThe Interregnum of Najibullah, 1989–1992 181