victims of the Soviet–Afghan war, and their inadequate socialisation
in significant measure accounted for their ability to do things which
would have been unthinkable in traditional Afghan society, such as
rain blows on women in the street. The movement also contained
Khalqiswho had joined the Taliban out of ethnic solidarity, whom
the prominent talib Mulla Muhammad Masum Afghani described
as ‘communists...who have abandoned their old ideas’ (BBC
Summary of World BroadcastsFE/2234/A/1, 22 February 1995). In
addition, as the Taliban continued to spread through the country, a
large number of people prudentially switched to their side, provid-
ing them with an ostensibly large, but in fact rather fragile support-
base. Finally, the Taliban attracted some moderate Pushtuns who
clung to the hope that the Taliban would pave the way for the
return of Zahir Shah. Moderates of this ilk were hardly ISI’s cup of
tea, given their attachments to the Afghan regime which had been at
odds with Pakistan over Pushtunistan, but they did perform the use-
ful function of reassuring the Americans that there were Taliban
supporters with whom they could deal.
The Deobandi heritage
The backing which they received from Pakistan did not come only
from Babar and from the ISI. As well, the Taliban received support
from trucking mafias and drug barons (who benefited from easy
movement on roads in Afghanistan) and from provincial govern-
ments. They also had a ready supply of manpower, and here, the
mushrooming network of Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan (associ-
ated with a Pakistani political party, the Jamiat-e Ulema-i Islam)
was of crucial importance. The term ‘Deobandi’ derives from the
town of Deoband in India, where in 1867 an institute by the name
of Dar ul-Ulum Deoband was established (Metcalf, 1982).
Deobandi ideas were very influential in Afghanistan, where
madrassas of Deobandi orientation provided the bulk of the Afghan
ulema (Roy, 1990: 58). On occasions in the twentieth century, the
Afghan ulema had emerged as a potent political force, especially in
the last years of King Amanullah’s rule (Nawid, 1999), but in
The Rise and Rule of the Taliban, 1994-2001 225