prosperity without justice’ (cited in Springborg, 1992: 264).
Unfortunately, the need to deliver justice can be short-circuited by
foreign support, which injects wealth for the state’s direct use. The
removal of Daoud in 1963 and the inauguration of the so-called
‘New Democracy’ period was not a reaction against this approach
to running the state, but rather against other elements of Daoud’s
policies. The regime on the eve of New Democracy was partially
legitimate, largely because the instrumentalities of the state,
although ubiquitous, did not seek to exploit its penetrative, regula-
tory, extractive and appropriative capacities. But its foundations
were becoming shakier.
The decline of state legitimacy: 1964–78
The ‘New Democracy’ experiment began with the drafting of a
new Afghan constitution, which provided for institutions with a
strongly democratic flavour. An elected lower house (Wolesi
Jirgah) lay at the heart of its attempt to install a new system of
government, but equally important was its attempt to exclude the
royal family from the political executive. From 1963 to 1973, a
series of commoners occupied the position of Prime Minister, and
relatively free elections were held in 1965 and 1969. The jurists
responsible for the drafting of the constitution took pride in its
undoubtedly progressive dimensions (Reshtia, 1997), and there is
no doubt that those interested in politics enjoyed more freedom
than ever before. However, the new order failed to secure legit-
imacy on legal-rational grounds. Politics in the absence of for-
malised parties proved disorderly and inefficient. Plato’s
description of democracy as an agreeable form of anarchy proved
all too precise. More seriously, the Afghan bureaucracy proved
extraordinarily dysfunctional. Writing at the time of the communist
coup, Kakar observed that ‘Afghan civil servants are probably
among the lowest paid in the world. It is impossible for them to
live decently on their salaries unless they are supplemented by
other sources of income. Corruption and embezzlement are
accepted facts of Afghan bureaucratic life and are objected to only
The Road to War 15