Resolution 1333 of 19 December 2000. This moved from econom-
ic to military sanctions. The key operative paragraphs, 5 (a) and 5
(b), dealt not simply with the actions of states, but required states
to prevent ‘the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer to the ter-
ritory of Afghanistan under Taliban control... by their nationals
or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of
arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and
ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equip-
ment and spare parts for the aforementioned’ and to prevent ‘the
direct or indirect sale, supply and transfer to the territory of
Afghanistan under Taliban control... by their nationals or from
their territories, of technical advice, assistance or training relating
to the military activities of the armed personnel under the control
of the Taliban’. These measures put Pakistan in a very difficult
position. Pakistan responded in two ways. First, it protested that
the sanctions were having dire humanitarian consequences. This
claim was tested and found wanting by a UN study: the Secretary-
General advised that while ‘there are adverse humanitarian effects
from the current sanctions regime’, those effects ‘are limited,
and their scope and magnitude is greatly exceeded by the effects of
the other factors causing humanitarian suffering, most notably the
unprecedented drought, the continuation of the conflict and
the widespread deprivation of human rights’ (United Nations,
2001b: para. 67). Second, Pakistan sought to evade the terms of
Resolution 1333: this was made clear, albeit obliquely, by an
expert UN committee which in May 2001 concluded that to
‘believe that the Taliban are still surviving on former stocks is
naïve’ (United Nations, 2001c: para. 31). The USA was reluctant to
pressure Pakistan over its violations: some in Washington appar-
ently still held to the belief that Pakistan might use its good offices
to moderate the Taliban. This illusion collapsed in September
- If American officials had laughed or slept through the rise of
the Taliban, by the evening of 11 September they were deadly ser-
ious and wide awake.
250 The Afghanistan Wars