the Soviet leadership as a ‘self-stabilizing oligarchy’ (Rigby, 1970),
and this lay at the heart of its weakness. Promotion within the sys-
tem owed a great deal to the ability of a bright achiever to find an
appropriate patron, and to rise on the tide of that individual’s
patronage (Willerton, 1992). But to profit from a patron in this
sense involves a willingness to function as a loyal client, and this
in turn could involve turning a blind eye to much that was going
wrong. As a result of this and other factors, the system was
increasingly riddled with corruption. ‘Official corruption’, wrote
Clark, ‘diverted the energies of relatively competent bureaucrats
from the administration of state policies to the orchestration of
self-aggrandizement’ (Clark, 1993: 219; see also Holmes, 1993:
214). As economic performance declined, the Soviet system faced
a range of pressing problems (see Dibb, 1986; Malia, 1994:
351–401; Keep, 1995: 165–328) but the Brezhnev leadership’s
handling of Afghanistan was to be treated during the later
Gorbachev period as one of the key symptoms of the deeper
malaise of ‘stagnation’ (zastoi).
FROM COUP TO INVASION
The April 1978 coup
Terrible events can be triggered unexpectedly by an assassin’s bul-
let. On 17 April 1978, a prominent Parcham ideologue variously
described as being of Ghilzai Pushtun or of Qizilbash origin, Mir
Akbar Khyber, was assassinated in Kabul. The identity of his
assassins remains a mystery to this day. Some have attributed the
slaying to Daoud’s Interior Minister, Abdul Qadir Nuristani
(Harrison, 1979: C5), while others have pointed to the Khalq’s
Hafizullah Amin as the likely instigator (Rubin, 1995a: 317;
Dorronsoro, 2000: 100). But whoever was responsible, the rever-
berations from their shots can still be felt. They led directly to the
overthrow of Daoud ten days later. A large crowd turned out for
Khyber’s funeral, and Daoud, panicked by the size of the crowd,
The Road to War 25