nected problems: ‘the language problem and the patriotism prob-
lem’ (Rakowska-Harmstone, 1990: 79). There is anecdotal evi-
dence pointing to fraternisation between the Afghan population and
Soviet soldiers of Central Asian background during the early
months of 1980 (Wimbush, 1985: 242; Sarin and Dvoretsky, 1993:
88); however, whether the subsequent replacement of some of
these Central Asians with Slavs was a conscious move to maintain
the political cohesion of the force, or simply a routine replacement
of reservists after their 90-day period of active duty came to an
end (Jones, 1985: 208), remains in doubt.
Political control of the military had always been a matter of con-
cern to the party elite, and the device for ensuring it was the Main
Political Directorate of the armed forces. At the time of the invasion
of Afghanistan, it was headed by General Aleksei A. Epishev, who
had been its Head since May 1962. Epishev, despite his military
title, was not a line professional. He had served as Deputy Minister
of State Security under Stalin, and then served in turn as First
Secretary of the Odessa Party Committee, Soviet Ambassador to
Roumania, and Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia. The Main
Political Directorate, which was responsible to the party Central
Committee, comprised a hierarchy of staff honeycombed through the
military, in much the same way as the Party existed at workplace
level in civilian enterprises. Political officers were tasked with main-
taining morale and ideological commitment, through indoctrination,
criticism and self-criticism, and maintaining an atmosphere of activ-
ity and flux to keep the military on their toes (Kolkowicz, 1967:
84–98). The context of all this activity, of course, was a formal com-
mitment to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Any erosion in this
was likely to fuel a crisis of faith at different levels of the military.
SOVIET STRATEGY
Strategy, according to Colin S. Gray, is ‘the use that is made of force
and the threat of force for the ends of policy’ (Gray, 1999: 17).
Strategy in this sense obviously requires that there be a policy-
Soviet Strategy, Tactics, and Dilemmas 41