complex phenomenon, and its complexity was accentuated by the
diverse interests of its different elements, of military circles in
Pakistan, and of political leaderships in the Western world, the
Middle East, and China. A tragic result of these divergences of
interest was that when the Afghan communist regime finally col-
lapsed in 1992, there was no unified group or party capable of
exercising legitimate rule throughout Afghanistan’s territory. The
consequences in terms of Afghan political order remain all too
palpable.
POPULAR MOBILISATION IN AFGHANISTAN
Islam as a basis of resistance
Popular resistance to an occupying force is by no means inevitable,
and in many cases of foreign occupation, significant elements of
the population of the occupied country have opted either to col-
laborate – as did many French following the fall of France and the
establishment of the Vichy regime – or to remain passive, either
because of a lack of interest in politics, or from a desire to move
with the currents of prevailing winds. In Afghanistan’s case, deter-
mined resistance emerged, particularly in rural areas where the writ
of the state was weak. Resistance was motivated by a range of fac-
tors, including calculations of interest, but the power of Islam as a
basis of resistance proved of fundamental importance. Religions
can provide a basis for resistance in at least two different ways. On
the one hand, religious doctrines and practices may endow certain
individuals with authority, which they can then use to lead others
in a political struggle. On the other hand, religion can serve as an
ideology of resistance, by providing direct legitimacy to resistance
in certain circumstances, even in the absence of authoritative fig-
ures to exercise a leadership role. On the whole, the role of
‘authoritative religious leaders’ was somewhat limited in
Afghanistan: Sunni Islam lacks a ‘clergy’, or indeed a hierarchical
leadership, and authoritative figures were thus more to be found in
58 The Afghanistan Wars