1995: 79–95; Olesen, 1995: 274–97; Rubin, 1995a: 196–225;
Dorronsoro, 2000: 155–89); here I can only identify those which
were for one reason or another to prove politically important. It is
important to distinguish between different Sunni Muslim parties,
and between Sunni and Shiite parties.
Sunni Mujahideen parties were conventionally divided by com-
mentators between ‘moderate’ and ‘fundamentalist’, but the dis-
tinction was an unfortunate one (Saikal and Maley, 1991: 62). In
the former category were placed three parties broadly sympathetic
to the monarchical regime of Zahir Shah, and led by Pushtuns: the
Mahaz-e Milli-i Islami Afghanistan, led by Sayid Ahmad Gailani, a
notable Sufi who had been pir (master or spiritual leader) of the
Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood in Kabul since 1947; the Jabha-i Milli-
i Nijat-e Afghanistan, led by Sebghatullah Mojadiddi, a well-
known member of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi brotherhood who had
been imprisoned by Prime Minister Daoud for allegedly plotting to
assassinate Nikita Khrushchev; and the Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami
Afghanistan, led by Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, who
had been a colourful member of the Wolesi Jirgah during the New
Democracy period. Muhammadi’s large but loosely structured
party attracted many traditional religious figures who were subse-
quently to support the Taliban (as did Muhammadi himself); this in
itself serves as a warning against the too-ready use of expressions
such as ‘moderate’.
Four parties were classified as fundamentalist. Somewhat con-
fusingly, two went by the name Hezb-e Islami, or ‘Party of Islam’;
one was led by Mawlawi Muhammad Younus Khalis, and the other
by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the former a Khogiani Pushtun, and the
latter a Pushtun from Kunduz. Khalis attracted some powerful field
commanders; Hekmatyar attracted support from the Pakistani mili-
tary, but suspicion from Afghan circles, largely because of his ruth-
less and uncompromising character. A small party, the Ittehad-e
Islami Afghanistan led by Abdul Rab al-Rasoul Sayyaf, was
notable for the financial support it received from Saudi Arabia.
Finally, the Jamiat-e Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a
Badakhshi Tajik who had taught in the Faculty of Theology at
The Development of Afghan Resistance 63