The USA was the principal backer of the resistance in financial
terms. However, other states provided support in diverse ways. The
Thatcher Government was firmly opposed to the Soviet invasion,
and British Special Air Service (SAS) personnel not only trained
resistance fighters, but entered Afghanistan for operations. A range
of countries – including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Egypt, West Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and
the United Kingdom – provided medical treatment for Afghans with
complex neurological or orthopædic injuries under an ‘Afghan
Medical Programme’ run with US backing by the Intergovernmental
Committee for Migration (ICM). Furthermore, many governments
put the Afghanistan issue on their agendas for bilateral discussions
with the USSR: China even identified the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan as one of the key factors which would have to be
addressed if the Sino–Soviet dispute were to be resolved (Holmes,
1989). All these measures helped reassure the Mujahideen that they
were not fighting alone.
Arab reactions to the invasion
The resistance also received significant support from a number of
Arab governments. President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt was a close
ally of the United States, and in addition had access to stocks of
Soviet–made weaponry dating from the period of close
Soviet–Egyptian relations prior to 1972. Sadat’s Egypt became a
major link in the weapons supply chain. But even more important a
role was played by oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The Saudi General
Intelligence Service, headed by Prince Turki al-Faisal Saud,
provided funds to support the resistance, although it is almost
impossible to work out the volumes involved. According to one
source, Arab monies roughly matched US funding (Yousaf and
Adkin, 1992: 77), but these Arab monies included direct gifts from
private Arab sources to resistance parties – and some party leaders
(notably Sayyaf, who spoke excellent Arabic) were adept at tapping
such sources. The motivation for this support was more complex
The Development of Afghan Resistance 81