F
FACTIONALISM
Within the colonial community of medieval Ireland,
factionalism is a theme traditionally associated with
the later Middle Ages. Factionalism was, however,
endemic from the outset of English involvement in
Ireland. The 1169 invasion was essentially an initiative
of an acquisitive Anglo-Norman nobility, and lust for
land immediately caused rivalries to develop within
the new colonial baronage. In this scramble for power,
the Anglo-Normans manipulated the factious Gaelic
political system, supporting competing Gaelic lords in
an attempt to undermine their own Anglo-Norman
rivals. These struggles at times amounted to civil war.
What is interesting is that, far from attempting to
assuage such violence, it was unofficial royal policy
to promote rivalries in Ireland. An example presents
itself at the first instance of royal intervention in Ireland,
the expedition of Henry II in 1171
−
- Concerned
by the independence afforded by Strongbow’s Leinster
power base, the king counterbalanced him with a grant
of Mide (Meath) to Hugh I de Lacy. Such practices
inevitably caused friction and ultimately violence
within the Anglo-Norman community in Ireland.
We should note that to excite conflict in this man-
ner was contrary to the contemporary concept of the
king as the provider of justice and the arbitrator,
rather than promoter, of disputes. It was, moreover,
extraordinary in practical terms, since the king’s nat-
ural instrument of government in remote lordships
was the nobility. Yet it was precisely this group that
royal policy undermined. An explanation for this
behavior is found in the English crown’s preoccupa-
tion with affairs on the continent, which meant that
it could not afford to allow the baronage of its new
acquisition in Ireland too great a measure of inde-
pendent power.
Examples of the king exploiting personal rivalries
in order to curb the power of nobles in Ireland are
manifold in the first century of the lordship’s history.
King John’s license to Hugh II de Lacy to oust John
de Courcy from Ulster in 1205 is perhaps the supreme
case, but the practice was perpetuated by seemingly
less capricious monarchs. The assassination of Richard
Marshal by members of the Irish baronage in 1234
was particularly sinister because it took place under
the king’s peace. Henry III was almost certainly com-
plicit in the murder, reputedly offering Marshal’s
Leinster lands to those who could “bring him, dead
or alive, before the king.” It could be objected that
the barons in Ireland were merely fulfilling their obli-
gation to oppose an enemy of the king. However,
given that those involved in the assassination had a
history of conflict with the Marshal family, it is dif-
ficult to escape the conclusion that Henry III delib-
erately exploited rivalries in Ireland to eliminate a
political opponent.
Although the disturbances in Ireland typically had
local causes, there was a tendency for them to become
immersed in the factional conflict that intermittently
engulfed England. At the very least the barons of Ireland
saw such moments of confusion as an opportunity to
indulge their local ambitions. During the Barons’s
Wars in England in the 1260s, for instance, a dis-
pute emerged between the Geraldine leader, Maurice
fitzMaurice, and Walter de Burgh, recently made earl
of Ulster. In December 1264, a number of the earl’s
supporters
including the royal chief governor
were
taken captive by the Geraldines, who may have acted
at the instigation of the anti-royalist barons in England
led by Simon de Montfort. This family rivalry re-
emerged in the next generation. In 1294, Richard de
Burgh, Walter’s son, was imprisoned by the then leader
of the Geraldines, John fitzThomas, baron of Offaly. In
both cases, however, it seems likely that the real issue
was domestic and stemmed from de Burgh’s theoretical
overlordship of Geraldine lands. John fitzThomas’s