274 A History of Judaism
issue raised in a later generation. Nonetheless it is possible to discern at
least the outline of debates in particular periods, and to see that for the
most part the topics for discussion were generated within the academies
themselves by a passion for logic and precision rather than a need to
respond to pressures from outside.
The hermeneutical methods employed by rabbinic scholars in teasing
out the law followed principles which could be, and were, systematized
by the third century ce at the latest. They were highly complex:
Anything which is included in the general statement and which is specified
in order to teach [something] teaches not only about itself but also teaches
about everything included in the general statement ... Anything that is
included in the general statement and which is specified as a requirement
concerning another requirement which is in keeping with the general state-
ment is specified in order to make [the second requirement] less stringent
and not more stringent ... Anything that is included in the general state-
ment and which is specified as a requirement in the general statement and
which is specified as a requirement concerning another requirement which
is not in keeping with the general statement is specified either to make less
or more stringent ... Hillel the Elder expounded seven methods before the
Elders of Bethyra. A fortiori, and analogy, and two verses, and a general
statement and a particular statement, and something similar to it in
another place, and a thing is explained from its context.Lists like this one (from Sifra) were refined and expanded many times in
rabbinic circles in antiquity, reflecting both a high degree of methodo-
logical self- awareness among rabbinic interpreters and the willingness
of individual sages to seek exact means to reach what seemed to them
the best religious outcome for living practice. The lists reflected rather
than shaped the actual process of formulating the law. The relationship
of the lists to interpretation practice was complex. Some principles
found in all the lists are rarely found in actual use, and there seems to
have been tacit acceptance that some of the more imaginative methods
deemed appropriate for interpreting narrative should be eschewed when
it came to interpretation of legal texts.
Recourse to biblical prooftexts was generally in support of a legal
opinion already reached by other means. Thus the midrashim of the
tannaitic period (Mekhilta on Exodus, Sifra on Leviticus, and Sifre
on Numbers and Deuteronomy) can be best understood as attempts
to align a separate discourse based on legal reasoning with the biblical
text: