88 Chapter 5
expand its borders by exiling Koreans and, later, to claim those lands the
Koreans had settled on. It stated:
In regard to several of the motives of an internal po liti cal character, it is
essential to highlight an internal po liti cal motive that guides Japan, which
is to conduct the po liti cal exile of Koreans to the Korean districts in the
Rus sian Far East and Kando. This Korean immigration stretches from
the environs of Korea, [where they] legally remain Japa nese citizens and
settle there or in the areas bordering on the Korean district [in the RFE].
Although these are territories of another state [the USSR and China], Japan
views this as the natu ral expansion of the borders of Korea, which during
expeditious conditions, they will keep and formally petition for through interna-
tional leg al terms. In practice, Japa nese diplomats can cite pre ce dence when
it [the Japa nese government] tries to utilize this motive in order to annex
the territory of the settled Korean immigrants to Japan (the annexation of the
Chinese- Korean territory Kando was absolutely unsuccessful as a consequence of
the interference by several interested states and the Intervention in part of the
Rus sian Far East beginning in 1920) [italics mine]. That moment absolutely is
related to our resolution of the Korean Question in our pres ent situation.^46One might ask, “What were the legal or diplomatic foundations for the Rab-
krin report?” There is no mention of this view ever having been espoused by
Japan formally, although during the Intervention, Japan claimed Koreans as
their citizens. Furthermore, there is strong evidence from Japan’s treatment
of Koreans in Manchuria (Gando/Kando/Chientao) that they did not con-
sider the Koreans in the RFE to be their informal “citizens.” The Chientao
Treaty, which was signed by Japan on April 5, 1910, made Koreans in the
Chientao region (in China) Chinese subjects under Chinese law and juris-
diction. This treaty and its stipulations were still extant in 1929.^47 However,
Japa nese military and diplomats in Manchuria did make statements that
informally claimed diaspora Koreans as Japa nese citizens, but these were
nothing more than attempts to proj ect Japa nese influence and po liti cal/dip-
lomatic rhe toric aimed at the USSR. No formal legal or diplomatic changes
(by Tokyo) were ever made to the status of Koreans in Chientao even after
the inception of Manchukuo in 1932.
A final rebuttal to the Soviet- generated Rabkrin report is the fact that
in 1924, Japan outlawed dual citizenship for its citizens. Japa nese in the dias-
pora who were citizens, for example, of Brazil or the United States of Amer-
i a, would not be considered Japa c nese citizens.^48 This 1924 law excluded any
possibility that Koreans who were Soviet citizens could have been considered
legally as Japa nese citizens. The Rabkrin and NKID reports demonstrate a