104 Chapter 5ethnographically, psychologically, and in their own worldviews closer to the
Japa nese than to us. That the Koreans will soon turn into Soviet citizens
will never occur. We should never wait for them to change their convictions,
character, and worldview.^103Arsenev stated unequivocally that, based on the Soviet sciences of an-
thropology, ethnography, and psy chol ogy as well as his own personal obser-
vations and understanding of vari ous nationalities, the Koreans could not
become assimilated. Soviet nationalities policies and the government’s un-
derstanding of what constituted a “nationality” employed a contradictory
duality that saw race and nationality as malleable yet primordial.^104 Ar-
senev’s “Doklad” concluded with this recommendation:
Considering our close relations with the residents of Manchuria and Korea,
the fulfilment of danger comes closer and closer to being realized with
Koreans and Chinese within our borders. The principal means of conflict
against this consists of immediately and thoroughly removing and settling
the Chinese and Koreans outside of the borders with China and Korea and
expanding the colonization [of the RFE] from Western USSR and Western
Siberia, in d e pen dent of nationality, but not Chinese and Koreans. The latter
should be sent out to the deep interior of our country to the west or north of
the Amur. In our age, the economic defense of the country is so much more
impor tant than the armed protection; therefore, in the border regions it is
necessary to create such power ful organ izations such as the Stock Society of
Kamchatka [italics mine], which will give out earnings and supply them
with a market for agricultural products.^105Note that Arsenev mentioned that there should be more companies
like that of the Kamchatka Stock Society (KSS), which was founded (in
1926) as a result of the Soviet- Japanese Convention of 1925. This “stock
society” was in real ity a Soviet- Japanese fishing and seafood produce com-
pany. It purchased fishing equipment, employed Japa nese fishermen, rented
fishing boats, sold fish and other seafood products, and produced tin cans.
The Kamchatka Stock Society’s director was A. N. Korolev, a Soviet citizen.
In 1928/1929, KSS employed 4,388 Japa nese fishermen and 9,545 Japa nese
at its year of peak production in 1930.^106 The com pany was dissolved in- As a result of the 1925 Convention, there were more than one hun-
dred Soviet- Japanese joint ventures. They were perfect covers for Japa nese
espionage. Yet the Stalinist regime chose to blame the Koreans for espio-
nage instead while at the same time reaping the rewards of this cap i tal ist
venture from Japan.^107