106 Chapter 5It is in t ere st ing that G. N. Voitinskii, the former head of the Korean Bureau
(disbanded in 1924) and Khan Myon She, both of whom had worked on the
issue of the Korean autonomous region in 1923, were no longer part of
the Dalkrai leadership. In the resolutions section 133B on “The Question of
the Resettlement of the Korean Population (November 19, 1928),” there
were three points out of eight that were passed by Dalkraikom and note-
worthy (points 1, 2, and 3):
- Lead a decisive battle to eliminate the mood among Korean Party
activists to oppose the resettlement of the Korean population. - Propose to Raikom that, in the projected districts (raions) according
to the Plan for Resettlement, it stop the intolerable inactivity and the
sometimes direct and indirect re sis tance to the resettlement. Adopt all
mea sures as indicated by the resettlement organs in undertaking this
work. - Propose to the land and resettlement institutions that they quicken the
pace of work on the preparation of the land funds and grants with their
corresponding accounts so that the projected resettlement plan will be
completed by the planned date.^110
Point 1 of this resolution seemed to call for the repression of Korean activist
ele ments who were against Korean resettlement. This point undermined the
minority activism that korenizatsiia supported. It would seem that the or ga-
ni za tion most likely targeted would have been INKORPORE, a Soviet
Korean institution of vydvizhentsy (young and educated Koreans) who
defended and demanded that Korean citizens and recent immigrants be
granted equal access to land, farming equipment, resources, and other
issues. In fact, Geitsman’s 1928 letter mentions this or ga ni za tion: “It is
essential to note that the Koreans [in] ‘INKORPORE’ act as if they have
nothing at all to do with Japan. Exactly such a thing that the Japa nese Con-
sulate not once let slip in its multiple talks with us about the Korean popula-
tion in the Vladivostok okrug.”^111 The foreword to Resolution 133B (slyshali)
stated that the Korean activists were slowing down the pace of resettlement
by Soviet cadres and organs, so their removal would likely quicken the pace
of resettlement. Thus, it seems that some of the Korean activism supported
by indigenization was being reversed and or undermined in the name of
security and the geopolitics against Japa nese expansion as early as 1928.
The idea of an unchanging “other” among the Soviet Union’s national
minorities was far more entrenched than simply V. K. Arsenev. It had two
faces: one that was officially sanctioned and public, and the other that was
pres ent in populist and cultural media and channels of expression. An offi-