110 Chapter 5In this, we observed a ‘squabble,’ which we have called a ‘strug gle due to
groupism.’ ” Kim attributed the groupism (which was factionalist infighting
among the Korean communists) to three causes: (1) the Korean section of
the CP was young; (2) there were few Korean communists who had extended
experience in the class strug gles like the Old Bolsheviks; and (3) the stra-
tum of workers among the communists was insignificantly small. Kim con-
tinued: “Without a doubt during the purge [of Korean communists] there
was the attempt to accuse them as factionalists in order to widen the accusa-
tion to all [italics in original].... Together with this [the strug gle against
factionalism], it is necessary to carry on the strug gle against the mood of
some comrades who see in every Korean communist a factionalist, a trou-
blemaker, and a right- deviationist (faktsioner, sklochnik, pravouklonist).”
Kim noted that 98 percent of the Korean population w ere peasant-
farmers and that the 57 percent of the Korean cadres belonging to Soviet
institutions were also peasant- farmers. Kim’s final exhortation was: “We
cannot to any extent belittle the great significance and the necessity of the
strug gle with petty- bourgeois values, opportunism, and conciliation.”^127
Hence, there would be no appeasement with the Korean kulaks and no re-
duction of their repression. Unexpectedly, the specter of Khan Myon She,
who chastised the CP, the Comintern, and Moscow for chauvinism and a
continuation of tsarist nationalities polities in 1923–1924, resurfaced during
1929’s summer of factionalist infighting. Khan, who was directing the
Teacher’s College (Pedtechnicum) at Nikolsk- Ussuriisk, still exerted consid-
erable influence over the Nationality Soviet Men faction (formerly the Irkutsk
faction). In fact, Dalkraikom issued “Resolution 9” on July 10, 1929, barring
Khan Myon She from the Vladivostok okrug (the Primore). Khan was then
transferred to a similar position in Chita.^128 In conclusion, Afanasii Kim
did not find the rather high quota for the repression of the Korean kulaks
(15 percent) to be problematic, but when the accusations of factionalism
sought to tar the reputation of all Korean communists including the leader-
ship strata, he quickly hinted that this was chauvinism and a strug gle against
this “mood” was necessary as well.^129 Who could blame Afanasii Kim for
participating in the purges during collectivization? If Kim felt that he was
the best leader for the Koreans, then he had to be alive to guide, build, purge,
and rebuild the community.
The per s is tent belief that Koreans were agents of Japa nese empire be-
gan in the Dalbureau resolution to deport all Koreans in December 1922
and gained momentum after the Soviet government signed the 1925 Con-
vention with Japan. But the reports of Arsenev, Geitsman, and the Rabkrin
report reveal how deeply tsarist and Rus sian nationalist discourses had
penetrated and reshaped Soviet life, policies and even the archival reports