Security Concerns Trumping Korenizatsiia 129One example of this change in policy was Krasnoe znamia’s “The
Question of Local Nationalism.” While it noted that “ Great Rus sian chau-
vinism” still existed, it was alarmed at the “local nationalism” of the Chi-
nese in the Soviet Party school and pointed out that even the professors at
the school had compromised the Soviet nationalities line. The article noted
that, among the Chinese, “The national interests of the nationality are place
higher than the class interests. While the Party has always framed the [na-
tional] question in the opposite way.”^68 The article went on to state that the
Kuomintang and its agents were the reason this school had been corrupted
with Chinese nationalist fervor. It declared: “ Internationalist work [among
the Chinese] is incredibly weak but the class alien, nationalist party
[Kuomintang of China] does not sleep. It is no secret that the Kuomintang
is leading an energetic campaign among our Chinese workers.” Later that
same month, Krasnoe znamia also printed an opposing article “Strengthen-
ing the exclusive significance of the practical undertaking of the Leninist
national policy.” This article stated that, although the 16th All- Union Con-
gress noted that deviations of local nationalism now stood beside those of
Great Rus sian nationalism, the latter should remain the “greater danger.”
The article concluded that there were still many obstacles to national equal-
ity for the Koreans and Chinese in the RFE.^69
During indigenization’s first half (1923–1930), the greatest danger
had always been Great Rus sian chauvinism. This order had been established
by Lenin. The year 1931 was the apogee of the progressive and liberal agita-
tion (and debate) for equality and rights for Soviet national minorities in the
RFE. Thereafter, “local nationalism” would be seen as the greater danger,
because this nationalism was always linked with (if not led by) anti- Soviet
agents, wreckers, and states from outside the USSR and its allies.
The Mukden Incident of September 1931, which led the Japa nese
Kwantung Army to invade Manchuria and establish Manchukuo (Febru-
ary 18, 1932) would heighten the fear of foreign influences and curtail Soviet
internationalism. Japan, as a facade for establishing Manchukuo, withheld
official recognition until September 15, 1932. However, by September 1932,
Manchukuo had built the first of its four embassies on Soviet territory in
Blagoveshchensk. It was to build three more in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk,
and Chita. The USSR also began to pay Manchukuo and not China (nor
Marshall Chang) one- half of its profits from the CER despite the fact that
China was the designated recipient according to the Moscow- Peking and
Moscow- Mukden Treaties of 1924.^70 Although the Soviet Union withheld
official recognition of Manchukuo, these acts gave it de facto recognition
and monies.